Economic Analysis of the Responsibility of Social Networks

Análise Econômica da Responsabilidade de Redes Sociais

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RESUMO

Esta pesquisa analisa quais são os efeitos de um padrão de responsabilidade intermediária mais rigoroso, no qual as redes sociais são responsáveis pelo conteúdo gerado pelo usuário antes de uma decisão judicial ou ordem. Nossas estimativas mostram grandes perdas potenciais de pelo menos 47 milhões de reais em receita por ano e 23 bilhões de reais em valor de mercado. Além disso, do ponto de vista dos usuários, estimamos perdas anuais no bem-estar do consumidor devido a um padrão de responsabilidade intermediária mais rigoroso, entre 532 milhões de reais e 4,1 bilhões de reais. A pesquisa conclui que não há evidências de que tal mudança melhoraria as políticas de remoção de conteúdo ou o bem-estar econômico. Na verdade, isso pode levar a perdas consideráveis para plataformas, comerciantes e consumidores.


JEL: F14; K13;

ABSTRACT

This research analyzes what are the effects of a stricter intermediary liability standard, where social networks are responsible for user-generated content before a court decision or order. Our estimates show large potential losses of at least BRL 47 million in revenue per year and BRL 23 billion in market value. Furthermore, from the users’ point of view, we estimate annual losses in consumer welfare due to a stricter intermediary liability standard of between BRL532 million and BRL4.1 billion. The research concludes that there is no evidence that such a change would improve content removal policies or economic well-being. In fact, this can lead to considerable losses for platforms, merchants and consumers alike.

Keywords: Economic Regulation, Social Networks, Economic Well-Being.

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1. Introduction

The fledging legal research field of (private) online content moderation has spawned a large number of relevant and influential publications. This is arguably a subfield of freedom of speech studies or a part of law and technology research, and not all scholars devoted to this study subject identify themselves as focused on “content moderation”, even though they sometimes interact at conferences organized under this heading. These works have made notable advances in documenting and evaluating tasks performed by private platforms and websites—including, but not limited to, social media companies—of determining what speech they allow in their spaces and applying such rules in each isolated case.

In a clear contrast to traditional constitutional law studies devoted to assessing the compatibility of legal speech norms with constitutional guarantees and observing the role courts play in such assessments, studies of online content moderation have first described the characteristics of this rising, massive private review of speech and then moved to denounce its many pitfalls. Works have provided big-picture frameworks of what moderation is on the multitude of networks that compose the internet and of the different scale profiles of platform moderation and have produced accounts of the challenges that result from the incommensurable power wielded by private companies over global speech.

Largely missing from both the predominantly descriptive and openly normative studies is an attempt to acknowledge the difficulties of a private speech review system working parallel to a judicial speech review system that in many countries does not even factor in all of the intricate moderation efforts employed by private platforms. Furthermore, proposals for the relationship between these two avenues for speech review remain difficult to find. The first step in this direction, but one that still falls short of addressing these concerns, is recognizing certain government-adjacent characteristics of digital platforms as they perform content moderation and the need for careful and data-informed regulatory intervention.

Although some studies describe in more detail what Public Administration should do, a workable model requires consideration of how courts can and should fit into this new reality of how the limits of freedom of expression are determined. The level of court intervention and the

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5 The reading list compiled by the Social Media Collective is perhaps the best curated source for academic works on content moderation: https://socialmediacollective.org/reading-lists/content-moderation-reading-list/.

6 See, for instance, the Content Moderation at Scale, the fourth edition of which was held in 2019. Available at https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/como-at-scale-brussels-the-4th-edition-of-the-content-moderation-conference/. The same line of studies and similar groups of authors also present and discuss their work on events under the header of “platform governance”, such as the Workshop on Empirical Approaches in Platform Governance Research, hosted by the Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG) in 2020. Available at: https://www.hiig.de/events/workshop-on-empirical-approaches-in-platform-governance-research/.

7 One early example is work by Laura DeNardis, claiming that the “focus on institutions, while important, sometimes misses core governance functions carried out via arrangements of technical architecture and through policy decisions of private industry” ‘Hidden Levers of Internet Control’ (2012), 15 Information, Communication & Society, p. 721.

8 See James Grimmelmann, The virtues of moderation (2015), 17 Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Iss. 1, Art. 2, especially starting at page 55.

9 This is one of the valuable contributions of Robyn Caplan, Content or Context Moderation? Artisanal, Community-Reliant, and Industrial Approaches (2018), Data & Society Report. Available at: https://datasociety.net/library/content-or-context-moderation/.


11 Many have made this argument. One of the most recent and comprehensive contributions, focused specifically on what it means for American law, is Kate Klonick, ‘The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech’ (2018), 131 Harvard Law Review.

12 “In sum, Google and Facebook have the power of ExxonMobil, the New York Times, JPMorgan Chase, the NRA, and Boeing combined. Furthermore, all this combined power rests in the hands of just three people.” Luigi Zingales, Filippo Maria Lancieri, ‘Committee on Digital Platforms: Policy Brief. Chiago Booth’ (2019), Stigler Center for the Study of the Economics and the State.
legal liability standard they apply arguably influence platform rules and attitudes toward speech. If all content moderation decisions were simple and objective, different intermediary liability models would not have to consider risk aversion and overcompensation. The reality, however, is that platforms make millions of subjective judgment calls about user-generated content, using different mechanisms that vary in accuracy. The enforcement of internal content rules can be influenced by the fear of litigation and liability, causing platforms to swing more or less conservatively. As we consider new and improved models of intermediary liability, it is crucial to understand \textit{i)} why and how platform content review mechanisms vary in accuracy and consistency and \textit{ii)} what the effects might be of stricter liability standards on the behavior of social media vis-à-vis the speech they moderate.

The content policies of most platforms treat court rulings on expression as isolated events that are relevant solely to the specific speech that the claimant litigated. There is no institutionalized mechanism to allow or even stimulate jurisprudence on free speech produced by constitutional courts or international human rights courts to influence and enhance the platform’s abstract content policy. Scholars have consistently criticized this, indicating that international human rights law would offer some support for content policy systems\textsuperscript{13}.

Platforms seem to assume they can treat expression removed because of court orders and expression removed because of terms of use violations as substantively separate and distinguishable. However, there are certain elements in this distinction that become increasingly difficult to uphold. Most of the speech categories that companies have decided to ban are illegal in the majority of countries where they operate. They have constituted the bread and butter of judicial review of speech for decades.

As this separation continues to be forced, another unanswered question about the role of courts surfaces. If certain speech is litigated and upheld by a court with the argument that the Constitution guarantees it either because of substantive or procedural protections, can platforms then continue to censor that specific message or that type of speech without any kind of limitation on their autonomy?\textsuperscript{14} The point here is not to defend or criticize court rulings that penalize social media companies for what they see as inaccurate content moderation. We worry about the overlooked effect of courts applying liability standards.

The threat of liability posed by a potential court ruling that says a platform should have removed a certain post usually leads the company to improve its community standards and enforce them to avoid future convictions. The reverse is also possibly true: if courts, again based on a certain legal or constitutional standard, consistently reverse platform decisions to remove certain expressions, then the community standards would gradually evolve to reflect this more permissive stance. Again, the main question is: what are the effects of a legal liability standard and subsequent court rulings on the decisions a platform makes regarding its content moderation rules and their application? Would stricter liability standards cause platforms to preemptively censor more

\textsuperscript{13} “\textit{H}ow much will it matter ten or fifteen years from now that the First Amendment (and international human rights law) protect freedom of expression, if most communication happens online and is regulated by private platforms that do not—and are not required to—adhere to such long standing substantive norms on expression?” Evelyn Mary Asward, The future of freedom of expression online (2018), 17 Duke Law & Technology Review, 1, p. 31. “Viewing social media platforms through an Internet governance lens suggests several distinct areas of inquiry. One is the question of how national statutory mechanisms or international legal instruments attempt to, or should, regulate social media, whether for intellectual property rights enforcement, antitrust, privacy or other public interest concerns.” Laura DeNardis, A.M. Hackl, Internet governance by social media platforms (2015), 39 Telecommunications Policy, p. 762.

\textsuperscript{14} This phenomenon has been described as ‘content reactivation’. In Brazil, there already is a large number of court rulings ordering social media platforms to reinstate content or accounts, with Superior Court of Justice precedent going so far as to uphold a US$50 thousand penalty for a noncompliant social network. See “STJ mantém multa de R$ 254 mil ao Facebook por demora na reativação de página do Instagram”. Migalhas. Sept 1st, 2020. Available at: https://www.migalhas.com.br/quentes/332732/stj-mantem-multa-de-r--254-mil-ao-facebook-por-demora-na--reativacao-de-pagina-do-instagram.
expression than they otherwise would? How could we test such a hypothesis? What are ways to measure these effects in terms of platform behavior and social costs? The number of studies attempting to answer these questions is remarkably small.

2. How the Liability Standard Matters

As previously stated, why and how platform content review mechanisms vary in accuracy and consistency are important questions as they condition the possible effects of different intermediary liability regimes. A stricter or looser intermediary liability standard can cause significant variation in platform behavior toward expression before it is subject to legal requests for removal. This is because each decision about a specific post is highly subjective and context dependent. There will be room for different possible interpretations, and because this is about expression, the law should ensure platforms—and, therefore, users—appropriate breathing room. Social media companies know in advance that no system for making this decision about billions of posts, videos and comments will ever hit the target squarely every single time. Legislators should understand that as well. As platforms try to reduce the margin of error in one direction or another, they are susceptible to over- or under-censoring as a reaction to any given legal liability standard. Furthermore, the more inconsistent and inaccurate a moderation mechanism is, the more variation a risk-averse behavior can cause.

This fact has been surprisingly absent from the debates and rationales used by legislators and public authorities when they make decisions about the role and responsibilities of platforms. Most national legal responses to the highly complex task of ascertaining what online speech should be restricted either give private platforms a blank check to remove whatever they see fit with no consequences or, more often, overestimate the capability of private platforms to review millions of individual expressions within short deadlines, and subsequently fining them for failing to achieve the impossible. Intermediary liability is a trade-off, and the costs must be measured or estimated regardless of the chosen or proposed model.

What the solutions in, e.g., the North American CDA 15, the German Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz 16 and the Brazilian Marco Civil 17, underestimates is the level of sophistication and diversity of content moderation tools afforded by technology and decentralized gatekeeping. To some extent, this is due to a difficulty in realizing how unfit the constitutional rights balancing model has become for online speech today 18. Legislators often disregard that hundreds of millions of posts are periodically already removed by digital platforms without court

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15 Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act (CDA, 1996) famously states that "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider" (47 U.S.C. § 230). This immunity has been discussed extensively and, when criticized, it is normally based on the view that it provides an arrangement that errs on the side of too much speech. One possible countervailing interest that is not sufficiently addressed is the protection of youth, as they "tend to focus more on the potential benefits of information disclosure than they do on potential harms." Urs Gasser et al., Response to FCC Notice of Inquiry 09-94. Empowering Parents and Protecting Children in an Evolving Media Landscape (2010), p. 12. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559208. More recently, some level of jurisprudential erosion of such immunity would be required to protect against online terrorism. Danielle Keats Citron, Benjamin Wittes, The Internet will not break: Denying Bad Samaritans Sec. 230 Immunity (2017), 86 Fordham Law Review; Anka Elisabeth Jayne Goodman, 'When You Give a Terrorist a Twitter: Holding Social Media Companies Liable for Their Support of Terrorism' (2018) 46 Pepp L Rev 147, especially starting at p. 182.

16 Gerald Spindler, ‘Internet Intermediary Liability Reloaded The New German Act on Responsibility of Social Networks and its (In-) Compatibility with European Law’ (2017), 8 JIPITEC. The author points to elements of the German law that result in disproportional suppression of speech.

17 One of the largest substantive innovations of the Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet was the adoption of judicial notice and takedown, a liability standard much more protective of online speech than notice and takedown. For an explanation of this new model, see Nicoló Zingales, The Brazilian approach to internet intermediary liability: blueprint for a global regime? (2015), 4 Internet Policy Review 4.

18 I attempt to explain this in the first half of Ivar A. Hartmann, A new framework for online content moderation (2020), 36 Computer Law & Security Review.

EALR, V. 14, nº 2, p. 17-41, mai-ago, 2023
orders in an effort by these companies to comply with the law and fight harmful legal speech. At the same time, governments fail to even ask questions about either the accuracy of automated decisions on the content or the context in which human moderators do their jobs.

As legislators debate or implement stricter intermediary liability standards, impact analysis assessments are thoroughly absent. Social costs are sometimes considered but never properly weighed. There is questionable quality of analysis and collateral damage involved in the two alternatives for large-scale assessment of illegal or harmful content and the mechanisms for their external review. Governments seem to have placed much faith in private (automated or blue-collar work) and public (judicial) decisions. Stricter standards have aligned the incentives for an increase in automated decisions that are supposed to efficiently solve the problem. The result thus far is that they push platforms further against the wall, while civil society takes note that the spread of hate speech and fake news has only increased.

How have these systems fared? How susceptible are they to risk-aversion tendencies, overcompensation and, thus, excessive removals? The alternatives for speech review that strict liability and result-focused standards rely on surely do not have to be perfect. However, understanding their shortcomings is key to estimating the effects of diverse liability regimes.

2.1 The Alternatives

It might seem at first glance that judicial review would be a safe bet for course correction in cases where platforms fail to comply with the legal standard. However, court review is both unsustainable and subject to as much, if not more, bias than the human decisions produced by private content moderators. As platforms have published more speech in the last few years, millions of posts are reviewed every day either because they are flagged, notified or detected by artificial intelligence or as part of punishment administered to users19. Notice and takedown liability schemes fail in that they keep this review away from courts, inflating the power of the platforms over speech while creating significant incentives for companies to remove everything that is subject to notice20.

Judicial notice and takedown at least reduces the perceived risk of platforms, such that they are not as inclined to remove them first and ask questions later. Very few studies have raised a red flag about legal content that platforms unintentionally remove because of misaligned incentives. Danielle Citron was one of the first to do so21. Social media companies obviously cannot be required to sustain perfect filtering, so the more governments and courts push for a decrease in false negatives, with stricter liability regimes, the more companies will increase the false-positives, that is, legal content that is unduly removed.

Few content moderation studies acknowledge that judges are also biased, and this affects their rulings on speech22, with the aggravation that courts are rarely racially or gender-inclusive,
especially at the top\textsuperscript{23}. This is especially troubling given that a large share of abusive speech that society is trying to curb is precisely hate speech targeted at minorities. While civil society rightfully put the pernicious effects of private moderation in the spotlight, it is worth keeping in mind that more judicial review of speech is not inherently a good thing, especially when it is purposely viewpoint-oriented. The balancing of fundamental rights, a solution offered by constitutional law scholarship in many countries for judges to tackle hard speech cases\textsuperscript{24}, is very sophisticated in theory, but its application by lower courts has seldom been tested quantitatively. Empirical results from Brazil indicate a chasm between doctrinal intent and judicial practice\textsuperscript{25} that results in unpredictable rulings that are much less protective of speech than expected. Unpredictability increases risks for platforms; likewise, increasing the incentives to remove speech they are not entirely certain to be illegal.

A large part of the risk in judicial review of abusive content such as hate speech, defamation and fake news is arbitrary decisions where a judge believes common sense will enable them to reach a fair verdict. Ironically, the manual work\textsuperscript{26} performed by private contractors of companies paid by digital platforms is much less concerning in that respect. Moderators are trained to apply extremely detailed sets of rules for speech without overthinking the rules themselves and prioritizing the value of consistency and coherency. Some level of predictability, however, is the only positive aspect of this second alternative. Even though they perform essentially the same job as judges ascertaining whether a certain expression is permissible according to certain rules, private moderators receive a small fraction of the formal training and compensation\textsuperscript{27}. However, this is not the most urgent problem.

Unlike judges, their entire heavy workload consists of arbitrating the merits of posts, pictures, and videos. Because only questionable content is directed to their attention, private

\textsuperscript{23} This is a worldwide phenomenon. See Alice J. Kang et al., Breaking the Judicial Glass Ceiling: The Appointment of Women to High Courts Worldwide (2020), The Journal of Politics (preprint), https://doi.org/10.1086/710017.

\textsuperscript{24} There is a monumental number of works in different countries on constitutional law and rights balancing, especially in the case of solving conflicts between free speech and opposing rights such as privacy and honor. Alec Stone Sweet, Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008), 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Balancing has been adopted by international courts (see, for instance, Eduardo Andrés Bertoni, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights: a dialogue on freedom of expression standards’ (2009), 03 European Human Rights Law Review; Jean-François Flauss, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the Freedom of Expression’ (2009), 84 (03) Indiana Law Journal) and national constitutional courts such as the German (see Klaus Stern, Das Staatsrecht Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band IV/1. Die einzelnen Grundrechte (C.H. Beck, 2006), p. 62; Christian Starck, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz. Band I. Band 1, Präambel, Artikel 1 bis 19 (Franz Vahlen GmbH, 2005), p. 591; Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof, Handbuch des Staatsrechts. Band IV – Freiheitsrechte (C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1989), p. 662) and Brazilian courts. One of the current Justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court had already defended this model in a widely cited work 10 years prior to his joining the Court: Luis Roberto Barroso, ‘Colisão entre liberdade de expressão e direitos da personalidade. Critérios de ponderação. Interpretação constitucionalmente adequada do Código Civil e da Lei de Imprensa’ (2004), 235 Revista de Direito Administrativo.

\textsuperscript{26} Studies produced with data science and random sampling show that state trial courts in Rio de Janeiro, the second largest court in the country, when deciding about freedom of expression, apply balancing or cite any jurisprudence at all in only half of the rulings. Ivar A. Hartmann, A Liberdade de Expressão na Primeira Instância do TJ-RJ (2020), 18 Revista Opinião Jurídica issue 27. When the Brazilian Supreme Court decided this type of case in the last two decades, 70% of its citations to precedent referred to rulings by the Court itself where not workable substantive standard on freedom of expression were presented. Ivar A. Hartmann, A Crise dos Precedentes no Supremo: O Caso dos Precedentes sobre Liberdade de Expressão (2020), 6 Revista Estudos Institucionais issue 1.

\textsuperscript{27} The first widely circulated report on the work of content moderators was a shock both because of its information and because of the utter lack of transparency that had shrouded this moderation strategy until then. Adrian Chen, Inside Facebook’s Outsourced Anti-Porn and Gore Brigade, Where ‘Camel Toes’ are More Offensive Than ‘Crushed Heads’ (2012), Gawker. Available at: https://gawker.com/5885714/inside-facebook’s-outsourced-anti-porn-and-gore-brigade-where-camel-toes-are-more-offensive-than-crushed-heads.

\textsuperscript{27} “Facebook says in a company statement that moderators receive ‘extensive training’ that includes ‘on-boarding, hands-on practice, and ongoing support and training.’ Gray describes his training as only eight days of ‘pretty cursory’ PowerPoint displays presented in rote fashion by a CPL staff member.” Paul M. Barrett, Who Moderates the Social Media Giants? A Call to End Outsourcing (2020), NYU Stern Report, p. 13. Available at https://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/faculty-research/who-moderates-social-media-giants-call-end-outsourcing.
moderators are consistently exposed to the most vile and terrifying expressions known to humankind. The profound and probably long-lasting negative effects on their mental health have been documented by qualitative studies\textsuperscript{28}. At the very least, for research to begin assessing the sustainability of this alternative, more data are required about the numbers, profiles, work conditions and decision reversal rates of private moderators\textsuperscript{29}.

If one could look past this, there is the issue of local and regional culture. Whatever the work conditions of private moderators, the system will remain highly questionable if platforms assign workers to make decisions on content produced in a culture they do not know or understand\textsuperscript{30}. Most, if not all, types of abusive speech suppressed by companies are directly tied to a particular language and set of mores. Addressing hate speech produced in a cultural and geographic setting with groups of moderators that are disconnected from it results in a high number of both false positives and false negatives\textsuperscript{31}.

Propping up artificial intelligence against abusive content is the alternative with the lowest human and financial costs for implementation and the most consistent decisions—but only at the surface\textsuperscript{32}. The worst part of automated content moderation is that policymakers usually misunderstand how it functions and overestimate its accuracy. It is much easier to explain to lawmakers the downsides of the previous two alternatives than to make them fully understand the difference between supervised and unsupervised machine learning or to have them grasp what the relationship is between regressions and natural language processing. The opacity of artificial intelligence\textsuperscript{33} has allowed overconfidence in its accuracy for arbitrating difficult speech review cases. As a result, policymakers tend to see a strict intermediary liability standard coupled with fully automated content moderation as a solution with a small or nonexistent margin of error and no visible, substantial fallout. None of these assumptions has been empirically tested.

A research project on multistakeholder roles in content moderation performed over fifty interviews with members of the Brazilian Congress, the Judiciary—including sitting judges of the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice—and the Federal Administration, as well as journalists from national circulation newspapers. In the semistructured interviews where interviewers prodded them about the challenges of fighting abusive content on platforms, interviewees never even mentioned concerns about automated moderation. Nobody was remotely preoccupied with accuracy,
transparency or explainability\textsuperscript{34} of the models used by social media companies to cast hundreds of millions of decisions about freedom of expression\textsuperscript{35}.

Under pressure to come up with solutions, lawmakers in many countries have turned to explicit or indirect obligations for platforms to swiftly and silently remove as much problematic content as possible using software\textsuperscript{36}. Meanwhile, studies indicate that artificial intelligence is still years away from being a decent substitute for human moderators in ascertaining the limits of free speech\textsuperscript{37}. Prior automated filtering to detect copyright violations already used by YouTube for several years remains a blunt and opaque instrument, impervious to any public accountability\textsuperscript{38}.

The use of artificial intelligence in content moderation runs much deeper than merely removing abusive content, a process that only covers a subset of online expression. AI is also the foundation of recommender systems. It does not solely influence what content platforms keep us from seeing; rather, it also decides with what content we actually end up interacting\textsuperscript{39}. This parallels the fact that purchase decisions on Amazon are increasingly the result of successful algorithm recommendations\textsuperscript{40}. Algorithms that decide who should be exposed to what content to drive engagement and raise ad revenue are, therefore, a much more influential cog in the social media machine than content moderation schemes. Regulating recommendations\textsuperscript{41} would have far more impact than imposing stricter liability standards with the hopes of regulating content itself. We should expect, but have not yet tried to model or measure, the effects of stricter intermediary liability regimes on the design and practice of recommending systems. Would content of ambiguous legality be recommended less often to fewer people?

Policymakers tend to overestimate the performance of platform mechanisms that issue decisions on specific instances of speech—be they in disagreement with community standards or with the law—and, therefore, underestimate their inaccuracy in the regulation of expression. In a

\textsuperscript{34} “Software also faces limits of explainability, which is a problem for legal decision-making. Software can often explain how it reached a decision but not why. That may be fine for a thermostat, but is a limitation for a system that is supposed to both satisfy those subjected to it and prompt acceptance of an adverse ruling.” Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat The Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems (2019), 119 Columbia Law Review, issue 1, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{35} Ivar Hartmann, Yasmin Curzi, Nico Zingales and Clara Almeida (Orgs.), Moderação de conteúdo online: contexto, cenário brasileiro e suas perspectivas regulatórias (Alameda, 2022, forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{36} Section 3, (2), 2 of the German Network Enforcement Act of 2017 forces platforms to remove “manifestly unlawful” content in 24 hours. The European Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market that came into force in 2019 almost featured an obligation for platforms to use upload filters. The EU Parliament later watered down that clause – to the dissatisfaction of copyright attorneys. See Axel Nordemann, Upload Filters and the EU Copyright Reform (2019), 50 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law.


\textsuperscript{38} “Going beyond the statutory framework, voluntary mechanisms of algorithmic copyright enforcement do not afford alleged infringers with even the minimum due process protections set by the DMCA: they do not grant alleged infringers the right to contest content restrictions through a counter notice procedure, and they do very little in terms of validating copyright ownership rights.” Maayan Perel and Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement (2016), 19 Stanford Technology Law Review, p. 508.

\textsuperscript{39} “In fact, it’s the algorithm that chooses what to show a user that is credited with TikTok’s popularity, and it’s the ultimate ownership of that algorithm that is the sticking point in the sale of the company.” Gregg Leslie, TikTok and the First Amendment. TikTok users have free speech rights—and courts should pay attention (2020), Slate. Available at: https://slate.com/technology/2020/09/tiktok-wechat-first-amendment-free-speech.html.


\textsuperscript{41} For a detailed account of the pervasiveness of algorithmic influence in the behavior of social media users, see Jennifer Cobbe and Jatinder Singh, Regulating Recommending. Motivations, Considerations, and Principles (2019), 10 (3) Europen Journal of Law and Technology. The authors point out that algorithmic editorializing is not covered by safe harbor intermediary protection. Instead of suggesting strict liability to regulate this practice, however, the authors defend a more narrowly tailored approach that involves procedural guidelines.
notice-and-takedown jurisdiction, platforms are forced to anticipate the outcome of unpredictable court rulings about speech and then design and implement fallible content review systems by contracted moderators or artificial intelligence that attempt to hit a moving target. Under stricter intermediary liability standards, the impact on platform behavior could be significant, generating a substantial number of removals and thus significantly harming freedom of expression. These effects must be described and estimated.

3. Economic Literature on Social Media

The economic importance of laws is a traditional research topic in economic literature. Economic agents do not interact with each other removed from their legal environments, making legal institutions essential to economic efficiency. There is a strand of scientific research assessing the long-term impact of legal origins on economic development.

On a micro level, several works evaluate the economic impact of regulations, ranging from minimum wage, health care, and crime. Recently, a series of articles have analyzed how the introduction of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018 affected multiple markets, from advertising to health care. For example, Peukert et al. showed how internet traffic between the European Union and other regions was affected by the legislation, while Goldberg, Johnson and Shriver presented the effects of the data protection legislation on ecommerce.

The economic literature has methods to check and evaluate ex post effects of regulation, even if knowledge of how a specific market operates is not entirely developed. This is the case with online content moderation; while there is an increasing number of studies on the factors conditioning social platforms to moderate content, there is a lack of empirical research describing and modeling platform behavior.

Part of the theoretical literature is concerned with identifying what each platform will adopt on its own as the appropriate level of content moderation. Platforms have incentives to self-moderate their content, since content such as harassment and hate speech might drive users away. Platform revenue models are often based on advertising, and ad buyers normally do not want their brand to be associated with inappropriate content. Madio and Quinn proposed a model that incorporates brand safety concerns and the role of platforms in moderating user-generated content.

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42 In his seminal article, Coase argued that well-defined property could lead to efficient bargaining between agents. However, under positive transaction costs, such as those incurring legal uncertainty, economic welfare could be hampered. Coase, R. H. “The Problem of Social Cost.” The Journal of Law & Economics, vol. 3, 1960, pp 1-44.


Liu et al.\textsuperscript{50} analyzed how moderation technology and revenue systems (subscription or advertising) affect the incentives that platforms already must moderate.

A few works observe how distinctions in liability models might affect platform moderation strategies. De Chiara et al.\textsuperscript{51} analyze the incentives of platforms to remove content after notification from a copyright holder. Hua and Spier\textsuperscript{52} describe the optimal levels of platform liability for platforms that host harmful companies in their pool of clients, and Jeon et al.\textsuperscript{53} observe how content screening is affected by the different levels of liabilities that such companies are subjected to.

These theoretical models assume that some level of content moderation will already take place regardless of intermediary liability and that if the law somehow changes, then the new equilibrium can harm not only those companies but also consumers if the new regime stimulates companies to overmoderate. As previously explained, the alternative for content moderation is also an open question, as artificial intelligence might not be the most efficient method to curb some forms of illegal content such as hate speech, especially if moderation is focused on content rather than the user subnetworks and their intricate dynamics\textsuperscript{54}. Jimenes-Duaran\textsuperscript{55} used an experiment to show that users posting hate speech were not deterred by content removal.

A risk associated with over regulation, either by the government or by the terms of use established by each platform, is that there might be a chilling effect on users. That is, users will interact less (e.g., they will be inclined to reduce their posts and comments) with the platform if they perceive a potential risk of retaliation when their conduct is deemed inadequate. This is obviously the goal of moderation for users who disseminate harmful and illegal content, but the chilling effect extends well beyond abusive users and hurts legitimate expression. Observing users who received automated U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Right (DMCA) notices, Matias et al.\textsuperscript{56} showed that they interacted less with the platform after receiving automated notifications. This result is also observed by Penney\textsuperscript{57} after surveying users to identify the profile of people more susceptible to chilling effects.

In addition to chilling effects, there is also more recent literature discussing the value to consumers of accessing social networks. Some platforms have incentives to not charge users because they operate in a two-sided or multisided market\textsuperscript{58}, in which advertising “subsidizes” services to the user side. There is a risk of ignoring the fact that these consumers can also be affected by regulation even if they consume a service free of charge.

Using the concept of willingness to pay, that is, how much a consumer is willing to pay for a product, and willingness to accept, that is, how much a consumer must be paid to provide a product, recent studies have shown that users obtain benefits by consuming social media since they
have positive values of WTP and WTA. The works of Corrigan et al.\textsuperscript{59}, Brynjolfsson et al.\textsuperscript{60}, Mosquera et al.\textsuperscript{61} and Alcott\textsuperscript{62}, discussed in more detail in another section of this study, all show that consumers attribute a positive value to the use of social media. As such, a change in regulation that reduces consumer access to social media (e.g., by reducing the content available to consumers on social media) must account for this impact.

The recent economic literature on content moderation is still developing. Nevertheless, some characteristics are clear. On the company side, platforms already have incentives to moderate their content regardless of regulation. Furthermore, a change in the liability standard will alter the equilibrium, potentially affecting the welfare of users susceptible to overmoderation.

4. Methodology and Results

We apply three different methodologies to estimate the economic effects of digital platform liability due to user-published content, including the financial impact on the company of social media liability through a change in standards. We present each of the methodologies and their results in the following subsections.

4.1 Reports and Removals

Data obtained from Safernet, a nongovernmental organization “focused on the promotion and defense of Human Rights on the Internet in Brazil” (Safernet.org), show that among the social networks present in the ranking of 10 sites with the most complaints and removals of profiles from 2006 to 2021, more than 80% of the complaints received resulted in the exclusion of profiles by the platform. The ranking includes social networks with the highest number of users in each period, such as Orkut (until 2014), Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube and Tiktok. Safernet data also contain the distribution of reports and exclusion of profiles by report motives, as summarized in Figure 1 below.


Based on the annual variation (2006–2021) of complaints and profile removals on social networks carried out by Safernet, we performed a linear regression using the annual variation of profile removal as the dependent variable and the annual variation of complaints received as the independent variable.

Linear regression is a mathematical model that measures the correlation between two variables. In this case, we measured the correlation between the variation in the removal of posts by social networks and the variation in the number of complaints received.

The regression shows the variation in the number of profiles that each social network excludes per year (dependent variable $Y_{it}$) explained by the variation in the number of reports that each social network receives (independent variable $X_{it}$). In this case, the linear regression takes the functional form $\Delta Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta \Delta X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Figure 2 below shows the results we obtained from ordinary least squares estimation.

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63 For more information, see Wooldridge, J. M., Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data: The MIT Press, 2012.
The results show statistically significant coefficients, which means that we can conclude with 95% confidence that the correlation between the variation in removals and the variation in complaints is different from zero. In addition, we obtain a coefficient of determination of almost 90%. The coefficient of determination is a statistical tool that measures the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable that is predictable based on the variation in the independent variable. In the case of the removal of posts on social networks, these results indicate that the variation in the number of complaints is significant for the behavior of the removal of posts on social networks.

This base model is used with cross-section data. When considering data at different points in time, we can use regression with panel data. In the case of our model, we performed a panel regression that explains the evolution of the removal/reporting ratio before and after the Civil Rights Framework for the Internet (Marco Civil da Internet), controlling for the fixed effects of the different social networks.

As previously discussed, in 2014, Marco Civil instituted a judicial notice-and-takedown liability regime in which social networks are afforded greater legal certainty regarding the responsibility for the removal of posts. Thus, we are performing a regression considering the period before and after the statute.

Our regression, from panel data, is specified as

\[
\frac{\text{Removal}}{\text{Reporting}}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0(\text{Marco Civil}) + \beta_1(\text{Instagram}) + \beta_2(\text{Orkut}) + \beta_3(\text{Reddit}) + \beta_4(\text{Tiktok}) + \beta_5(\text{Twitter}) + \beta_6(\text{Youtube}) + \epsilon_{it},
\]

where “mc” is the binary variable for Marco Civil da Internet being in force. Based on this model, we obtain the following results.

---

**Figure 2 – Panel regression output**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post removal variation</th>
<th>0.850***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-341.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(316.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>0.909</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Standard error statistics in parentheses*

\* \(p < 0.05\), \** \(p < 0.01\)

**Source: Authors’ calculations**

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The outcomes not only show statistically significant results at the 95% confidence level but also obtain a high coefficient of determination (R²), which is nearly 90%.

Kohli and Jaworski define market orientation as the dissemination of information throughout the organization and the appropriate responses related to the needs and preferences of customers and competition. Kumar adds to this framework that an organization’s market orientation position leads the organization to better performance because management and employees have information about implicit and expressed needs of customers and competitors, as well as strengths and a strong motivation to achieve superior customer satisfaction. Narver and Slater separate market orientation into three elements, namely, customer orientation, competitor orientation and interfunctional coordination. The results obtained in the regression for the variation in the number of removals of posts on social networks suggest that social networks guide their content removal policy based on the behavior of the volume of complaints, indicating that this may be a component of the customer orientation policy of these companies.
These results corroborate the results obtained by Kumar and Narver and Slater68 regarding the Theory of Market Orientation. Kumar shows that companies69 that maintain an orientation centered on knowledge, that is, developed on their customer ecosystem (i.e., market orientation), obtain a sustainable competitive advantage. Narver and Slater also show that the adoption of market orientation yields greater economic profits for companies. Under the hypothesis that social networks adopt, at some level, a market orientation policy, implying greater profitability (Narver and Slater) and competitive advantages (Kumar), we would expect to see an efficient policy to remove flagged profiles on social networks. Efficiency in this scenario goes far beyond mere accuracy in decisions regarding the application of community guidelines and substantive legal standards for expression, which includes predictions on possible litigation, their outcomes, and costs.

The adoption of an efficient profile removal policy is also in line with the results obtained by Stahl, Heitmann, Lehmann and Neslin70. This study shows that brand positioning has statistically relevant results on customer acquisition and retention and on companies’ profit margins. A policy that does not remove profiles that disseminate harmful content would have a significant potential to hurt the brand positioning of that social network and, consequently, deteriorate the platform’s financials.

The empirical and theoretical results above suggest not only that social networks already carry out moderation policies that include restrictions on content and users but also that they have strong enough private motivations to carry out the exclusion of abusive profiles in a system that they find effective.

Safernet data show that although social networks exclude profiles that violate their rules based on privacy notices and user flags, almost 20% of reports do not result in profile deletions. A stricter intermediary liability regime could jeopardize the balance in privacy policy and force companies to increase the share of profile deletion.

We take a closer look at the case of Facebook, the platform with the largest number of users in the world. It had a market value of over 450 billion dollars in May 2022, and the Brazilian market represents close to 5% of its users worldwide. A different liability standard could stimulate the platform to ban even more users to avoid expensive litigation, jeopardizing the company’s operations with a market value equivalent to over one-fourth of Brazil’s GDP, without necessarily bringing any economic improvement, as discussed above.

We take Facebook’s annual revenue per user as a proxy for the entire social media market and assume that the share of the annual revenue per user relative to Brazil is proportional to the GDP per capita of Brazil in relation to the GDP per capita worldwide. From Facebook transparency reports, we obtain the total content removed by Facebook in the world. We estimate the total content removed by Facebook in Brazil by multiplying the total content removed by Facebook in the world by the percentage of Facebook users in Brazil (in relation to the total worldwide). This assumes uniform moderation across countries and regions worldwide, which is unlikely. However, platforms usually do not disclose country-specific data on moderation practices. Therefore, we move further, assuming moderation in Brazil is better proxied by the world average.

69 Narver and Slater (1990) define market orientation as “the organization culture that most effectively and efficiently creates the necessary behaviors for the creation of superior value for buyers and, thus, continuous superior performance for the business”.
We divide the estimate of content removed by Facebook in Brazil by the average annual number of posts per user in Brazil and obtain an estimate for the number of profiles for posts deleted in Brazil. We divide this last estimate by the proportion of excluded profiles from the Safernet database and obtain the estimated reported profiles on Facebook Brazil. Safernet data only represent a fraction of profile reports but are crucial to estimate the effects of action taken as a result of profile reports.

To obtain the estimate of profiles not removed by Facebook Brazil, we multiply the estimate for the number of profiles for posts deleted in Brazil by 0.2, based on Safernet’s deletion quotient, and obtain the estimate of profiles not removed (even after reporting) for Facebook in Brazil. We multiply this last result by the average value per Facebook user in Brazil and divide this result by Facebook’s Brazilian market share, finally arriving at an estimated figure for lost annual revenues. Similarly, we multiply the proportion of nonexcluded users (in relation to total users) by the sum of the social media valuation to obtain the valuation loss estimate.

This would mean that the social media market revenue in Brazil is approximately 4.5 billion reais per year. If the regulation were to encourage a higher share of profile removals in response to private notice and user flags, this would suggest that the gap between 80% and 100% of the bans described above could close. The current 20% of unfounded complaints that do not result in profile removal could turn into 20% of unfounded complaints that, because of the risk created by liability, end up causing profile removal. This would imply, given the estimated revenue per user in Brazil, an annual revenue loss of 56.3 million reais per year for the social media market in Brazil. The details of this calculation are presented in Figure 4.

**Figure 4 – Detailed Annual Revenue Loss Estimate**

| Total content removed Facebook (World) | 4,275,899,904 |
| Est. content removed (Facebook Brazil) | 203,614,281 |
| Est. removed profiles by Post (Facebook Brazil) | 1,696,786 |
| Reported profiles estimate (Facebook Brazil) | 2,056,976 |
| Estimate of unremoved profiles (Facebook Brazil) | 429,443 |
| Estimate of profiles not removed (All platforms Brazil) | 1,713,697 |
| **Estimated annual revenue loss** | **R$ 56,278,081** |
| **Estimated market value loss** | **R$ 27,562,871,323** |

**Source:** Authors’ calculations

These calculations can still be considered a lower bound, as they do not consider the possibility that, as social networks become more reactive to content and profile reports, users and nonusers might have a greater incentive to flag more content and profiles—both accurately and inaccurately.

We move further to evaluate the market capitalization loss for the social platforms industry. To do so, we change our measure of revenues by the total market capitalization from our benchmark social media, Facebook. We find an estimated market value reduction of R$ 27.6 billion reais due to excess removals in fear of litigation.

To compare the magnitude of the impact, we plot intertemporal platforms’ industry market value in Brazil based on publicly traded social networks. This estimate was made considering the world market value of each listed company. To estimate the share of the market value...
corresponding to Brazil, we used as a proxy the quotient of Brazil’s GDP in relation to the world GDP. Figure 5 summarizes these data.

![Figure 5 - Social Network Market Value in Brazil](image)

**Sources: Bloomberg, IPEAdat, Authors’ calculations**

Now, instead of the hypothesis that companies would “close the gap” and remove all reported profiles, we estimate the outcome in the case that companies’ removal/reporting behavior returns to that prior to the enactment of Marco Civil. Based on the regression and results shown in Figure 3, the revenue loss and valuation estimates would be somewhat smaller in magnitude.

**Figure 6 – Detailed Annual Revenue Loss Estimate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total content removed Facebook (World)</td>
<td>4,275,899,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated content removed (Facebook Brazil)</td>
<td>203,614,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated removed profiles by Post (Facebook Brazil)</td>
<td>1,696,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported profiles estimate (Facebook Brazil)</td>
<td>2,056,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of unreirmed profiles (Facebook Brazil)</td>
<td>380,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate profiles not removed (All platforms Brazil)</td>
<td>1,437,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated annual revenue loss</td>
<td>R$ 47,202,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated market value loss</td>
<td>R$ 23,118,055,309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This result implies that, in the event of a regulatory change that encourages companies to change their content moderation policy reverting to pre-Marcio Civil risk-aversion behavior, based
on Facebook data and assuming this change to be proportional for the entire market (considering market share), the annual revenue loss is estimated to be approximately R$ 47.2 million and the loss of valuation of the entire social media market is estimated to be R$ 23.1 billion.

The estimated social network revenue in Brazil implies an estimated annual revenue of R$ 16.5 billion for the entire market. A PwC study estimates that the internet advertising market in 2021 was R$ 18.7 billion, which would indicate that the social media market in Brazil represents approximately 88% of the internet advertising sector’s revenue. It should be noted that our estimate differs from the revenue estimates for the sector made by Statista Company DB, which calculates that the social media market was approximately R$ 7.8 billion, implying that social media represents only 42% of the online advertising market. If, instead of the revenue estimate presented above, we use the revenue estimates by the Statista Company DB sector, the estimated lost revenue would be R$ 22.2 million per year.

4.2 Impact on Consumers

The interaction between consumers and firms in a market is not a static process; firms compete with other consumers. Each market can be subject to specific shocks, such as mergers and acquisitions that affect the market or a change in regulation. As such, there are factors that are endogenous to the characteristics of the market, such as how firms operate and compete in the market and other factors that might be considered disruptive to the market. Regardless of the source of change in market characteristics, the traditional method of evaluating the impact on consumers is to observe how a change in prices affects consumers.

The immediate effect of a price change is a variation in the quantity consumed of the product; thus, if we know how much the users value the product, we can estimate the variation in consumer welfare due to price changes. The difference between how much each consumer values a product and how much she pays for it is the consumer surplus. It is possible to obtain the consumer surplus by estimating the demand function for a specific product. Therefore, given a market change in prices and demand curves, we can obtain the consumer surplus.

The price analysis is not easily implemented when the product is user access to a social network because these users usually pay nothing for the access, such that the usual methods of demand estimation cannot be applied. The fact that the price is zero does not imply that the consumer benefit is zero, however; if those consumers were willing to pay for access, then that value is the economic benefit of the social network.

Social networks usually operate in at least two markets. For users, they provide communication with other users and a space for content to be uploaded and visualized by other users. The other usual side is composed of the advertising segment of the market for the users of the platform. The cost of adding a new user to the existing pool of users is very small and effectively zero. Once a social network has already spent on its operational infrastructure (servers, for example), the electricity cost associated with a new user is marginal.

However, each additional user increases the benefit for other users since there will be more people to communicate with and to create content for, and there is a network benefit of adding users to platforms. Additionally, each additional user is another consumer who will be targeted by ads. In this way, the social network realizes a positive benefit by adding additional users. In this way, we have that the optimal pricing for social networks is to offer access to users free of charge and try to include as many users as possible in the platform.
Platform revenue comes from the (algorithmic) advertising side of the platform\textsuperscript{71}, but users can still have a welfare benefit even if for accounting purposes like the GDP this benefit does not exist. For the same reason, a change in regulation should consider these non accountable welfare effects on consumers. To quantify welfare, it is necessary to obtain the value of social networks to consumers. A liability regime that causes excess content removal and profile exclusions negatively impacts the welfare of social media users. The question, then, is how to estimate a figure for such an impact.

How much a consumer is willing to pay for a product can be associated with different concepts. Willingness to pay (WTP) is the maximum amount that they are willing to pay to obtain a product. Willingness to accept (WTA) is the minimum amount that a consumer is willing to be paid to sell or to relinquish access to a service. Under traditional economic theory, those values should be the same; however, there is robust evidence documenting that WTA > WTP\textsuperscript{72} for the same product. A possible explanation for this is the endowment effect, that is, the fact that individuals tend to place more value on an item they already own.

Recent papers tackling the social media market value adopt experimental methods to obtain WTA from their participants and then obtain consumer surplus by multiplying that by the number of users. Since Facebook is the largest social media platform in the world, it is not surprising that such studies calculate the social media welfare for that platform.

As previously explained, we estimated a loss of 1.7 million Facebook users in Brazil if there were a change to a stricter intermediary liability standard. To estimate the consumer welfare impact, we take the estimated value of Facebook from each related paper in the literature and calculate how much of the mean personal yearly income\textsuperscript{73} consumers are willing to spend on Facebook. This yearly income is from the United States, so we restrict the analysis to articles in which the experiment is performed in the United States. Herzog\textsuperscript{74} performed an experiment with participants from multiple countries, but we do not include it in this analysis. These studies report the median and mean value of Facebook access to the consumer, so we also adopt each of the available data.

We take both figures in each paper and apply that proportion to the latest yearly income obtained from “PNAD Continua”\textsuperscript{75} for Brazil. This calculation yields how much each Facebook user in Brazil values access, which we, in turn, multiply by the 1.7 million users that are estimated that would be lost due to a change in regulation.

Brynjolfsson et al.\textsuperscript{76} selected a sample representative of Facebook users in the United States for experiments performed in 2016 and 2017. They report results for a single-binary discrete choice, in which each participant is asked once to forgo access to Facebook for a specific price. These prices are systematically changed across the participants. With these responses, they then estimate a demand curve of payment to forgo Facebook for a month and the percentage of participants

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Richard Graham, Google and advertising: digital capitalism in the context of Post-Fordism, the reification of language, and the rise of fake News (2017), 3(45) Palgrave Communications 1.
\item \textsuperscript{73} U.S. Census Bureau, Mean Personal Income in the United States [MAPAINUSA646N], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MAPAINUSA646N, June 29, 2022.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Available at: https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/rendimento-despesa-e-consumo/9171-pesquisa-nacional-por-amosta-de-domicilios-continua-mensal.html?&t=destaques
\item \textsuperscript{76} Brynjolfsson, Erik & Collis, Avinash & Eggers, Felix. (2019). Using massive online choice experiments to measure changes in well-being. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 116. 201815663. 10.1073/pnas.1815663116.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
who decide to forgo. From the demand curve, they obtain a median WTA of $48.49 per month in 2016 and $37.76 in 2017.

Corrigan et al.\textsuperscript{77} conducted a series of second-price auctions in which participants bid on the minimum price they were willing to accept to give up Facebook, and the winner of the auction had to receive the amount of the second lowest bid. The participants were an online sample recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform.

Mosquera et al.\textsuperscript{78} conducted an experiment using university students from Texas AM in 2017. They adopted Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanics in which the participant declares how much they would be willing to accept giving up Facebook. The researcher randomly selects a price, and if the price selected is higher than the chosen price, then the participant is paid to deactivate. This experiment had multiple phases, and some participants who had already received compensation and had given up Facebook for a week were exposed to the BDM mechanism a second time to accurately estimate the effects after they already had given up the first time. Participants had a median value of $40 per week and an average value of $67 per week.

Allcott et al.\textsuperscript{79} constructed a sample of online users who were paid to participate in the experiment, and at the end, the results were made to match Facebook on observables. They used BDM in three periods during this mechanism for the participant sample and eventually obtained a median WTP of 100 and an average of 180. Another interesting result from the paper is that they elicit WTA three times.

The results of these studies clearly diverge. One possible explanation is the difference in samples. Some studies tried to replicate the population that used Facebook in the United States, while others obtained samples in multiphase experiments, including periods where the individuals were already not accessing their Facebook accounts. Either way, we observe a large impact on lost consumer welfare that will not be accounted for in traditional calculations.

Figure 7 was produced using the values from each paper. Data on yearly income in the United States come from series MAPAINUSA646N in the federal reserve database, and Brazilian data are from “Pnad Contínua” (IBGE). The number of users removed from the platform was set at 1,696,786. According to this estimate, the lower bound for annual loss in consumer welfare due to a stricter intermediary liability standard is R$ 532 million, and the upper bound is R$ 4.1 billion.

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
5. Concluding Remarks

Social networks make up a market that has skyrocketed in economic relevance for Brazil, with growth of more than 2,000% in the last 10 years. In this context, the main question we address in this policy paper is: what are the economic effects of a stricter intermediary liability standard on the decisions a platform makes regarding its content moderation rules and their application?

Empirical findings support a model for how sensitive social networks are to complaints and how they react to user removals. Market orientation and branding literature corroborate results that show that social networks already have incentives to maintain an efficient policy for removing reported content even in the absence of legal obligations.

We apply three different methodologies to estimate the economic effects of digital platform liability due to user-published content. When using linear and panel regression models to analyze possible scenarios of a regulatory change that would encourage companies to adapt their removal policy, our estimates show large potential losses of at least R$ 47 million in revenues per year and R$ 23 billion in market value. Moreover, from the users’ perspective, we estimate annual losses in consumer welfare due to a stricter intermediary liability standard between R$ 532 million and R$ 4.1 billion.

In light of a possible change to a stricter intermediary liability standard, where social networks are responsible for user-generated content before a court ruling or court order, we conclude that there is no evidence that such a change would improve content removal policies or economic welfare. In fact, it could lead to sizable losses for platforms, merchants, and consumers.

6. References


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Hartmann Ivar A., Curzi Yasmin, Zingales Nicoló and Almeida Clara (Orgs.,) Moderação de conteúdo online: contexto, cenário brasileiro e suas perspectivas regulatórias (Alameda, 2022, forthcoming).


Robyn Caplan, Content or Context Moderation? Artisanal, Community-Reliant, and Industrial Approaches (2018), Data & Society Report. Available at: https://datasociety.net/library/content-or-context-moderation/.


Ivar Alberto Glasherster Lange Hartmann, Paulo Sergio Oliveira Ribeiro, Felippe Costa Bispo, Osvaldo Ignácio Baptista


Sarah T. Roberts, Behind the Screen: Content Moderation in the Shadows of Social Media (Yale University Press, 2019).


German Network Enforcement Act of 2017 forces platforms to remove “manifestly unlawful” content in 24 hours. The European Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market that came into force in 2019 almost featured an obligation for platforms to use upload filters. The EU Parliament later watered down that clause – to the dissatisfaction of copyright attorneys.


Economic Analysis of the Responsibility of Social Networks


For more information, see Wooldridge, J. M., Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data: The MIT Press, 2012


Narver and Slater (1990) define market orientation as "the organization culture that most effectively and efficiently creates the necessary behaviors for the creation of superior value for buyers and, thus, continuous superior performance for the business".


Richard Graham, Google and advertising: digital capitalism in the context of Post-Fordism, the reification of language, and the rise of fake News (2017), 3(45) Palgrave Communications 1.


U.S. Census Bureau, Mean Personal Income in the United States [MAPAINUSA646N], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MAPAINUSA646N, June 29, 2022.


