A CORRUPÇÃO E SEUS EFEITOS NO MERCADO DE ALIMENTOS: O CASO DA OPERAÇÃO “CARNE FRACA”

Jonathan Gonçalves Silva, Leandro Vinícios Carvalho, Leonardo Vinícius Nunes Oliveira

Abstract


This article aims to analyze the contribution of contracts with incentives to improve the functioning of the Brazilian food market, in a context of corruption. To do so, we used a Principal-Agent model in a sequential game to design an ideal contract to mitigate corruption in the aforementioned market. Such experiment was based on the “Carne Fraca Operation”, investigated by the Federal Police. The results indicate that the proposed incentives were able to align the interests of Agent and Principal, which reduced the chances of corruption and improved the functioning of that market. Nonetheless, the Brazilian institutional environment encourages the Agent to be corrupt, as the penalties are not harsh and the probability of a corrupt Agent be punished is just 25 percent.


Keywords


Contract design; "Carne Fraca Operation"; Corruption; Principal-Agent model



Economic Analysis of Law Review  -  ISSN 2178-0587

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