The Political Game of Impeachment in Brazil and The Case of 2016 Analyzed Using Game Theory

Odirlei Fernando Dal Moro, Ednaldo Michellon, Luan Vinicius Bernadeli, Martinho Martins Botelho

Abstract


The purpose of this article was to analyze the impeachment process that took place in Brazil in 2016 and through Game Theory. Three games were created with the following players: president of the Chamber of Deputies, the National Congress, the president of the Republic and his deputy. The games take place via perfect but incomplete information. The theme is current, relevant and without studies that relate to Game Theory. Therefore, unprecedented. We tried to show the possible results and the political aspects and it was concluded that in most of the cases the filed cases. Between 1990 and 2018 the suggested game was played 193 times, judging by the number of complaints filed, of which only 2 were filed. Finally, this work showed the movements of the parties between the 2014 election and the impeachment vote in 2016, suggesting that the referred process is also a political judgment. Not just criminal.


Keywords


Incomplete Information; Bayesian game; Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31501/ealr.v12i3.12474

Economic Analysis of Law Review  -  ISSN 2178-0587

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