An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem

Sanny Diniz Barbosa, Diogo de Carvalho Bezerra


The inefficiency in the process of obtaining a building permit in Brazil can be mitigated with the approval of new laws that allow a relationship of consideration for services between the public administration and self-employed professionals, especially the architect. A Principal-Agent model is proposed to formalize possible Immediate Liability laws for building permits. The URB-Architect relationship can be formulated through the game theory, and the results following optimal policies ensure a theoretical condition of actions previously carried out by the public sector to be carried out by self-employed professionals.


Game Theory; Law and Economics; Principal-Agent

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Economic Analysis of Law Review  -  ISSN 2178-0587

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