Preferências, Custos da Decisão e Normas Jurídicas no Processo Decisório das Cortes: o modelo de múltiplos comportamentos DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v2n2p264-296

Ricardo Ribeiro

Abstract


This article aims to develop an alternative formal model of judicial policymaking in Supreme Courts. Differently from the mainstream approaches of Law (legal model) and Political Science (attitudinal, and strategic models), we developed the hypothesis that multiple behaviors could be observed as a function of three main explanatory variables: political preferences of judges, the limits of interpretations of rules, and decisions costs involved in the judgment of the case. As a conclusion, ten propositions about judicial policy process were developed as a way to map the determinants of a final Court decision.


Keywords


Supreme Court, Multiple Behavior Model, Judiciary; Preferences



DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v2n2p264-296

Economic Analysis of Law Review  -  ISSN 2178-0587

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