Conciliação Cível em Primeira Instância em São Paulo: Perspectiva da Análise Econômica do Direito DOI:

Fernando Nimer


The article analyses the economic incentives to mediation of civil disputes over contractual rights taken to the Setor de Conciliação em Primeira Instância do Fórum João Mendes Junior (“Conciliation Sector”), in the State of São Paulo, in 2006. It analyses the “pre-processual” (informal) conciliation (i.e., when negotiation precedes litigation) and “processual” conciliation (i.e., when litigation precedes negotiation) proceedings, and suggests the judicial and alternative proceedings could be imperfect substitutes. It indicates a greater efficiency of the “pre-processual” proceeding if compared to “processual” one. The paper suggests the existence of a “deadline” effect, indicating that after some time has passed, the interest for reaching an agreement lowers dramatically. The mediation style and the strategy adopted by the mediator are essential to the success of agreements; however, there are psychological aspects that may influence the results. The participation of the contenders’ lawyers may difficult the agreement, if compared to cases in which the parties directly negotiate.


Conciliation; Mediation; Alternative Dispute Resolution; Incentives


Economic Analysis of Law Review  -  ISSN 2178-0587

Creative   Commons License Catholic University of Brasília - UCB