AN ANALYSIS OF THE BRAZILIAN LEGISLATION FOR QUALITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Authors

  • Pedro Hemsley FCE/UERJ

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31501/ealr.v7i1.6612

Abstract

Low-quality education is a major concern for public policy. In Brazil, the government addresses this issue with a Quality-Assurance Policy: colleges must be accredited before starting operation, and then are audited by the government periodically. Low-quality colleges suffer penalties that may include shutdown. This paper investigates the effectiveness of this policy in a signalling model in which education, whose quality is known, is used as a device for a worker to inform potential employers about his exogenous productivity. I have two main results. First, Quality-Assurance decreases the college sector, leaving students out. Second, it does not increase quality. Additionally, I show that high interest rates make the choice of high-quality sub-optimal for the college whatever the cost to provide quality, even if the Quality-Assurance Policy is most strict.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Pedro Hemsley, FCE/UERJ

Doutor em Ciências Econômicas pela Toulouse School of Economics (2013). Professor Adjunto da Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da UERJ.

Published

2016-06-30