AN ANALYSIS OF THE BRAZILIAN LEGISLATION FOR QUALITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Pedro Hemsley

Abstract


Low-quality education is a major concern for public policy. In Brazil, the government addresses this issue with a Quality-Assurance Policy: colleges must be accredited before starting operation, and then are audited by the government periodically. Low-quality colleges suffer penalties that may include shutdown. This paper investigates the effectiveness of this policy in a signalling model in which education, whose quality is known, is used as a device for a worker to inform potential employers about his exogenous productivity. I have two main results. First, Quality-Assurance decreases the college sector, leaving students out. Second, it does not increase quality. Additionally, I show that high interest rates make the choice of high-quality sub-optimal for the college whatever the cost to provide quality, even if the Quality-Assurance Policy is most strict.

Keywords


Signalling; higher education; quality assurance policy



Economic Analysis of Law Review  -  ISSN 2178-0587

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