NEGOCIAÇÕES ENTRE A GRÉCIA E SEUS CREDORES À LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS

Authors

  • Carlos Eduardo Gomes Universidade Estadual de Maringá
  • Claudeci da Silva Universidade Estadual de Maringá
  • José Luiz Parré Universidade Estadual de Maringá

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31501/ealr.v7i2.6803

Abstract

This work aims to analyze the rounds of negotiations between Greece and the Creditors in an attempt to get new loan installments to the scroll of the arrears and ensure the stability of the Eurozone. To accomplish the goals, we used two tools of game theory, they are: the Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Subgames and the Chicken Game. It was found that Greece and the Creditors are willing to avoid at any cost, a Greek exit from the Eurozone, because if this were to leave, would bring negative effects not only for Greece but also for the entire Eurozone and the European Union. Thus, it became clear that the best result achieved in the negotiations between Greece and the Creditors, is that there is an agreement and that it is not full of economic policy of austerity.

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Author Biographies

Carlos Eduardo Gomes, Universidade Estadual de Maringá

Doutorando no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Econômicas da Universidade Estadual de Maringá –PCE/UEM. 

Claudeci da Silva, Universidade Estadual de Maringá

Professora da Faculdade Cidade Verde (FCV) e Doutoranda no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Econômicas da Universidade Estadual de Maringá – PCE/UEM. 

José Luiz Parré, Universidade Estadual de Maringá

Professor Titular do Departamento de Ciências Econômicas e da Pós-Graduação em Ciências Econômicas da Universidade Estadual de Maringá – DCO/PCE/UEM. 

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Published

2017-01-27

Issue

Vol. 7 No. 2 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review

Section

Papers

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