O Favorecimento do Vendedor em Contratos de Adesão DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v2n1p155-169

João Francisco Menegol Guarisse, Bruno Bastos Becker

Abstract


Adhesion contracts are commonly viewed with suspicion by lawyers. They point to the fact that the clauses in those agreements usually favor the seller disproportionably. This article aims to understand this alleged pro-seller bias from an economic standpoint. Four theories have been analyzed. First, the hypothesis that adhesion contracts are the result of market power of the drafting party; second, the assumption that there is an asymmetry of information between consumers and sellers; third, the idea that consumers suffer from cognitive biases that prevent them the proper assessment of non-salient terms; fourth, the notion that suppliers – but not consumers – are concerned about their reputation in the market, what leads them to write contracts that protect from opportunistic consumers.

Keywords


Adhesion Contracts; Law and Economics; Market Power; Information Asymmetry; Behavioral Economics; Reputation



DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v2n1p155-169

Economic Analysis of Law Review  -  ISSN 2178-0587

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