Original Paper

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Military Intervention in Brazil: Pinnacle, Disruption and Decline

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Abstract

Brazil until the establishment of the Civil and Military Regime of March 31, 1964 coexisted with military coups, which ravaged the entire republican period and contributed to corrupt any democratic pretension of the nation. This article aims to examine the process that would have sought to withdraw the armed segment from political activity after that date, by means of an analysis of the course of political and strategic actions that led to a rupture with the previous paradigm and changes in civil and military relations and in the Brazilian democracy. In the theoretical and methodological framework, the argumentation, based on a hypothetical deductive approach, was supported by a dialectical path assumption, taking as a starting point the Moderator Model of Alfred Stepan, to which put an opposing configuration structure, so called Enframingment Antimodel, which supposedly would result in a form of very close relationship with that proposed by Samuel Huntington, named Civilian Objective Control. As a result, the study concludes by confirming the hypothesis of the work and, also, that the interference of the military rulers, besides restoring the lines of obedience, had provided the possibility of a change in the direction of the Brazilian democracy, in the sense its political development would be free from armed guardianship.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations; Brazil; 1964 Civil-Military Regime; Moderator Model; Civilian Objective Control.

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Introduction

This article has the purpose of explaining the process that aimed to remove the military from political militancy since the Civil-Military Movement of March 31, 1964 (henceforth CMM/64), by means of political and strategic actions antagonistic to the practices theretofore in use, which led to the rupture with the previous paradigm – in this text represented by the Moderator Model of Alfred Stepan (1971) – and which have had definite consequences for civil-military relations (henceforth CMR) in Brazil, approaching them to the standards of Civilian Objective Control (henceforth COC) (HUNTINGTON, 1996).

It should be, initially, noted that from the Proclamation of the Republic to such demarcating episode, there were mechanisms, including constitutional ones, allowing exceptional military prerogatives in moments of crisis: to guaranteeing the law, order and the functioning of the three powers; and that the military's obedience to the executive branch should only occur “within the limits of the law”.

By virtue of this latter prerogative, historically, orders from Executive used to be dependent on the discretionary decision of the military chiefs, especially in the occurrence of the frequent crises, which, collusioned with the civilian political leaderships, maintained positions of arbiters on the legality and legitimacy of orders of the rulers, not infrequently, lowering them from power.

Between 1889 and 1964, without considering minor events, there were sixteen episodes of internal political violence, including civil wars, revolutions and upheavals. Only considering from 1930 to 1964, such impasses provoke eight military interventions, in the form of coups or counter-coups of State. Such a set of historical experiences, inductive of conflicts between ethics, values, ideologies, convictions and interests, generated antagonisms that repeatedly smashed the mockery of a liberal democratic project, based on the republican model, that, despite the exceptionality granted, presupposed the primacy of the civilian power on the military and was in force since the Proclamation of the Republic; which, from 1946 to 1964, took the features of the Moderator Model (STEPAN, 1971).

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1 Dreifuss presents the civil and military characteristics of that movement (DREIFUSS, 1981). Original title of his Doctorate Thesis: State, class and the organic elite: the formation of an entrepreneurial order in Brazil (1961-1965). Daniel Aarão Reis deepens the notion of civil and military movement, demonstrating the continuity of the civil articulation in support of the permanence of the military rulers in the power (REIS, 2014). Together with other intellectuals, these authors allow to qualify the period as being a CMM/64.

2 The Constitutions of 1891 (art. 14), 1934 (art. 162) and 1946 (art. 176-178) followed this same understanding of the role of the military (BRASIL, 1891, 1934, 1946).

3 Revolution of 1930; New State, in 1937; Depositions of Getúlio Vargas, in 1945 and in 1954; Military putsch of 1955 from General Henrique Duffles Teixeira Lott; pre-emptive coup effected by the military ministers, in 1961; pre-emptive counter-coup of Leonel Brizola, in 1961; and CMM/64 (Author’s note, henceforth A.N.).
The context, briefly reported above, motivated the present article, which had, as its core premise, the understanding that Brazil, from 1964 on, stopped the coexistence with military coup, as was previously, together with other forms of political violence originated in this same armed segment, attitudes that devastated the entire republican period until that date, contributing to corrupt it, and to prevent any democratic pretension of the nation, since, in addition to other aspects, made it dependent on armed interventions as a means of unlocking the usual political crises, as demonstrated by Stepan (1971).

This perception, of rupture in the course of the phenomenon of interventionism, raised the question about what would have occurred in the Civil and Military Regime of 1964 (hereinafter CMR/64), (DREIFUSS, 1981; REIS, 2014) between 1964 and 1985, which could have uncoupled the active military segment from political activities? This finding becomes more relevant if one considers: the hegemonic understanding of the academic literature in the sense of the permanence of military involvement with politics (STEPAN, 1971; SODRÉ, 1979; PEIXOTO, 1982 etc.); or, at least, the existence of an alternation between the professional soldier, in periods of normality, with the political soldier and his interventions, in moments of conflict, in a continuum for the historical future (FIGUEIREDO, 1980; CARVALHO, 1985); vis a vis the serious outdated crises, without any military interference.

Thus, the assumption that supported this investigation, in order to elucidate the issue raised to judgment, consisted in considering that there was a notable interference during the CMR/64, which aimed at suppress the disseminated participation of the military in politics, instituting, among several alternatives, an attitude of antithesis to that interventionist formula (effective between 1889 and 1964, particularly against that one represented by the Moderator Model), which reached, in the end, a structure of CMR with characteristics close to the COC (HUNTINGTON, 1996).

Such an assumption, from hypothetical deductive feature, will not be the focus of this text, in the sense of exposing variables and tests, but may, however, consist in object of another issue. The lens in this article will be addressed to the dialectical inflection caused by such interference, in the sense of evidencing its characteristics and contrasts, notably with the thesis, represented by the Moderator Model, and with the synthesis, in another stage of equilibrium, in democracy, under a new CMR, whose contours approach it to the COC.

Although these structures of relationship are close to ideal types, they keep great convergence with the reality, which, in the same way, as it has been used to make their constructions possible, provides the opportunity to demonstrate their statements and confirm their judgments. Therefore, this text, submitted to the natural limitation of space, in search of support for its reasoning, will only present some factors that make it possible to verify the effectiveness of the proposed new structure as an analysis tool, just as Huntington (1996) and Stepan (1971) proceeded in their
works. In order to achieve what was above exposed, the arguments in this article will present: aspects that influenced the period before 1964 and brief foreshortening of the Moderator Model; the proposal of an antithesis, the so called Enframement Antimodel, and the data, facts, events and influences that provided the basis for its characterization; the CMR balance structure – according to the this author understanding –, based on the COC, in conformity with the Huntington (1996) proposal, and the degree of adherence of the military segment to the parameters of this last structure at the end of CMR/64; and, finally, the synthesis of the research, privileging the examination of the repercussions of the possible new paradigm for the CMR and for the (re)establishment of the democracy in Brazil.

Civil-Military Relationships Models

The Thesis: Moderator Period

Alfred Stepan, in his theorizing about the Moderator Model, explicitly refers to the theoretical envelope that dominated the Brazilian political environment in the context of his study from 1946 to 1964: the “praetorianism” (STEPAN, 1971, p. 49) as formulated by Rapoport (1963) and presented by Huntington (1975). In short terms, praetorianism consists in the politicization of social forces and institutions, by groups – ethnic, religious, economic, territorial, from status, occupational or technical; financial, business and landowners; intellectuals, students, workers, peasants; bureaucratic officers, including military ones; classes; among others – and there are no institutions to (or are incapable of) mediating the eruption of the conflicts generated by the continued political mobilization, coming from these segments and caused by gaps originated for differences in politics, economics and social developments rhythms.

Additionally, Huntington (1996) presented - in The Soldier and the State, , along with the COC - the Civilian Subjective Control (henceforth CCS), configuring a situation in which civilian leadership admitted “[...] in general that civilian control has something to do with the relative power of the civilian and military groups. It is assumed that civilian control is achieved insofar as the power of military groups is reduced [...]” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 99).

In this context, the objective of civilian leadership would be to maximize the power of civilian groups against the war fraction, making its components a mirror of the various representations of those segments within the State and the armed forces, while denying them existence as an independent sphere of power (In practice, however, there was fragmentation, dissension and impossibility of Armed Forces professionalization, since, with the incorporation of the military segment to its policies and strategies, each civil group would seek to increase its own power over that of others, whether through governmental institutions, social classes or constitutional forms. The result would be the weakening of military and national security (HUNTINGTON, 1996).
Another aspect not less important, as pointed out by Huntington (1996), is that these multiple forms of military incorporation into civil affairs would lead to the inevitable participation of the military in politics, resulting, after all, in a reduction of civilian control, as to increase the involvement of this segment in institutional, class and constitutional politics, not being improbable the uncontrollable preponderance of the military. This theoretical framework of the CCS, inserted in the more embracing explanation of the praetorianism, is incorporated in this argument as (molds and frames) representative of the conditions involving the CMR that would be showed in the Moderator Model.

Due to the commitment of the armed segment to political activity in the period before CMM/64, in addition to the aforementioned fragmentation, dissension and lack of professionalization of its components, since the Proclamation of the Republic was installed a vector that would become more and more influential: the denial of the principle of authority. Later, would gain access the ideologies, which, in their struggles, would cause numerous acts of violence and deaths, opening irreconcilable wounds, and leading to a military anarchy.

This matrix, present throughout all the republican history until 1964, appears on several occasions, and in comments from the chiefs, who were molested, although often committed to political activity in the barracks. According to general Góis Monteiro, at the very beginning of the Getúlio Vargas Interim Government “[...] there was a kind of double Army: what obeyed the orders of the revolutionary HQ and what obeyed the Minister of War [...]” (apud PEIXOTO, 1960, p. 46). This, amid the regimentation of components of the Armed Forces, carried out by radicals of all shades, that went from the communists to the integralists (Brazilian fascists), from these, resulting in two coups attempts, respectively, in 1935 and 1938.

Referring to the getulist period, Nélon Werneck Sodré (1979), records that “the interference of the revolutionary military in the politics and in the administration of the country brought obvious disturb to the Armed Forces’ daily life” in opposition to the professionals “[...] who honestly espoused the thesis that reserved to the barracks the activity of the soldier [...]” (SODRÉ, 1979, p. 245). Among these, Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, future Brazilian President, then an Army Captain, on the occasion of the convening of the Constituent Assembly in 1933, wrote several articles in the Gazeta do Rio, under the pseudonym of “Colonel Y”, dealing precisely with this question, whose ideas would be used later on in the wake of a new regime4 (BRANCO, 1933a, 1933b, 1933c, 1633d, 1933e, 1933f, 1933g, 1933h, 1933i, 1933j).

The end of the New State (1937-1946) contributed to add adherents to military participation in politics. New characters were introduced: the military clubs, fomenting this activism, supporting or opposing the rulers, even serving as the epicenter of

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4 The full transcription of these articles can be found in PINTO (2016, p. 395-415), and (2019, p. 429-448).
agitations involving the armed segment, whose emanations spread to schools and military organizations, places where their publications were read and debated.

In addition, the most varied hierarchical levels were often involved in party-political disputes, which did not occur without the participation of students, academics, trade unions, the press and public opinion how was exposed in Alfred Stepan’s work. If these conditions were not enough to generate intractable cracks in the military structure, with Henrique Batista Duffles Teixeira Lott, Minister of War of Juscelino Kubitshek, enlisted were added to the cauldron of anarchy. The colonel Luiz Helvécio da Silveira Leite, explicit the fact of general knowledge for the military of the time:

He (Henrique Lott) created a direct network with the sergeants. A sergeant from each unit should write directly to him. This was fatal because he lost, so to speak, a cornerstone in the matter of hierarchy. [...] So the hatred this provided: The sergeants wrote directly. Any incident inside the barracks ...The sergeant rapporteur could go directly to the Minister ...So when I arrived at a colleague, the answer came: ‘You cannot serve here. Your name is in the file of the First Army [...] it is in the Second Section of the Cabinet of the Minister.’ (ARGOLO, FORTUNATO, 2004, p. 92-93).

Starting from a timid participation, always conditioned by the leadership of the officers, the enlisted would perform more prominently in the “Novembrada” (1955), acquiring more, and more autonomy, until they became protagonists and, almost, stole the scene, between 1961 and 1964, when already were among the main exponents of anarchy. They would become one of the main fuses of the Military Movement of March 31, 1964. The active participation of the enlisted is evidenced in the report below made by Governor Leonel Brizola, radical leftist at that time, on the Pre-emptive Counter-coup (1961):

Throughout the crisis, and in the three Armed Forces, in a series of scandalous episodes, the sergeants, who were given the right of blind obedience, and with much stronger reason than the officers, showed a firm will to disobey, for having understood that to obey, in this case, was to go against the country and the people. They thus penetrated into the content of military obedience and military hierarchy [...] (Brizola apud SODRÉ, 1979, p. 367).

The deterioration of hierarchy and discipline was a natural consequence of such state of affairs. Numerous events warned about the approaching storm: frequent blows, major symbols of system failure; the “Manifestations” of the Colonels and Generals, then added by the Sergeants, ending up in the Soldiers and Sailors, anyway in this dis(order). The chaotic final featured prominence in Rio de Janeiro: the rally of Brasil Central Station; cultural sessions with film reproduction and other activities, with tutoring by teachers of the Ministry of Education, for students and members of the Association of Mariners and Sailors, with exhibitions of the Potenkin Battleship, added by the comment “[...] now you know what to do with your officers [...]” (MARTINS,
The spinning of the military tissue had reached a point where hierarchy, discipline, ethics, and values were in rags. The replacement of the coupists military ministers, in 1961, unsustainable in office because of their attitudes, the assumption of an apparatus favourable to the new government, and, furthermore, supported by the populism and trade unionism, triggered a permanent conspiracy, supported by political, military and entrepreneurship framework, with established goals, strategies and tactics that predicted even acts of sabotage (DREIFUSS, 1981).

In fact, in the midst of an environment that can be classified both in the CSC and in the praetorian framework, that is to say, of military involvement with politics, it was difficult to reach the highest posts without more than one politician supporting the candidacy. According to Stepan, for the Brazilian military, the traditional elites, on whom they used to depend, had narrow and personal interests, just as the disadvantaged classes, especially unionized workers, defenders of corporate, sectarian and despicable goals, opposites, many times, to national well-being (STEPAN, 1971, p. 35). This author also points out that the military segment, on the other hand, considered itself to be a group without special class interests, whose ideals were directed towards full national development, a self-image that went beyond that which aimed exclusively at national defence, also, contributed to the legitimation of the arbitration of political events in moments of crisis. Together with the belief of being the uniformed people, became a logical foundation for the expansion of the Military Power (STEPAN, 1971, p. 35).

However, the fact that they were mostly middle class made them participants of the characteristics of this social stratum, such as: heterogeneity, lack of agglutinating objectives of the class as a whole and fear for the rise of disadvantaged classes. In spite of this, because they were military, in theory, possessing a greater degree of articulation and cohesion, they constituted the only sector, monitored and/or controlled by the middle class, with these attributes, reason why it appealed for their interventions in moments of crisis, once did not feel threatened by them, since they would tend to represent and protect its concerns (NUN, 1965, p. 76; STEPAN, 1971, p. 37).

For this author, because of the European cultural heritage of the Brazilian

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5 According to Francisco Dornelles, nephew and then private secretary of the Prime Minister Tancredo Neves, in March 1962 he received a phone call from his aunt, married to the brother of General Castello Branco, informing him that there were three vacancies for four stars general (Army General); that had been informed, two would be of the indication of João Goulart and the third one would be of Tancredo Neves; she asked him to interfere, because had already spoken with his brother, the father of Francisco Dornelles, and he had said that if he were to speak it would be for him not to be promoted. He forwarded the case to Tancredo who “sponsored” the promotion (TANCREDI, 2014).
elites, they historically refused to accept the military’s permanence in government, which, if on the one hand, served to clarify the nature and limits of the role to be played for them in the politics by the, on the other, it was the main component of the Moderator Model of CMR for the period (STEPAN, 1971, p. 50). Stepan explains that “historically, civilians who form the politically important layers of Brazilian society have always tried to use the military to achieve their own political goals”, in which they were reciprocated by the “diversity and openness of the Brazilian military institution,” and military “who were always highly politicized”, and that, “as a result of the internal divisions of the Armed Forces and the attempts by civilian groups to bring them to politics”, they were not unanimous in their political and ideological convictions, reflecting wide diversity of public opinion (STEPAN, 1971, p. 53).

The Moderator Model, among other characteristics, should keep operating the current political system, usually through military interventions, supported by a broad consensus, that could occur to conquer, maintain or prevent access of pretended rulers to Power, which, after the interventions should be returned to civilians. For Stepan, the main components of this pattern of civil and military relationship can be summarized in some basic points:

1) All the main political protagonists seek to co-opt the military. The norm is a politicized military; 2) The military are politically heterogeneous, but also seeks to maintain a degree of institutional unity; 3) Important politicians guarantee legitimacy to the military, under certain circumstances, to act as moderators of the political process, controlling or deposing the executive, or even avoiding breaking the system itself, especially when this involves a massive mobilization of new groups previously excluded from participation in the political process; 4) The approval given by the civilian elites to the politically heterogeneous military to depose the executive greatly facilitates the formation of a winning coup coalition. The denial, by civilians, that the deposition of the executive by the military is a legitimate act, conversely, prevents the formation of a coup victorious coalition; 5) There is a firm belief among civil elites and military officials that while it is legitimate for the military to intervene in the political process and in the temporary exercise of power, it is illegitimate for them to assume leadership of the political system for long periods of time; and 6) Taken generically, this value-congruence is the result of civil and military socialization through education and literature. (STEPAN, 1971, p. 50-51).

Antithesis: The Enframement

The diagnoses that served to explain the Moderator Model by Alfred Stepan (1971), largely extracted from the reality he examined, including the military he interviewed, constituted a thorough demonstration that they had a deep knowledge of their problems, since periods very before to the outcome of their movement, like was already mentioned. In the context of the logic presented as the guiding principle of this study, it was possible to construct, abstractly, an antithetical model to that prevailing in the period prior to CMR/64 – from the contours delineated by the Moderator Model.
able to allow analysis of the actions that aimed the interruption of the march of corruption and weakening of the system, through military participation in politics, in the form of an Anti-Model, which was called “Enframement”, presenting itself with the following configuration:

1) The political protagonists were coerced in the action of co-optation of the military and the norm was to depoliticize the military; 2) It became necessary to homogenize, neutralize and sterilize politically the military, an action that contributed to greater institutional unity; 3) There were no further disruptions, inductive to military interventions; the politicians were kept in the legitimating function, no longer to sustain the system in the crises, but to provide continuity and to endorse constitutional and legislative reforms; at the same time, there was a relative freezing of new groups, whose rare representatives involved themselves with marginal portions of the military; 4) There was no need any more for approval by the civilian elites, the military extracted their political strength from the own corporation and the civilians became coadjutants, including as auxiliaries in the format, structuring and maintenance of the regime; 5) The military rulers took over the political system and remained in it with partisan political support and parliamentary and popular votes and encountered themselves in conflict with their own professional ethics; which one was resolved on the basis of its submissions to the ethics: Machiavellian, from means, ends and maintenance of power; and Weberian, of the responsibilities, supported by careful construction of legitimacy, both institutional and in the armed segment, which assured them the permanence in power. When the military rulers reached the political center, toppling the military system, paradoxically, acquired the conditions to adopt the measures needed to break with the practice of interventions, removing the military fraction from political activity; 6) It became necessary to recondition the military mentality to remove the belief that they should constantly save the country from itself.

The analysis of the dynamics that conformed and was conditioned by such a theoretical structure will use historical facts and contributory events to extract the causal and explanatory inferences in support of this construction, whose approach will be divided into three characteristic periods: Before, During and After Institutional Act n. 5 (henceforth IA-5) (BRASIL, 1968).

The Civil and Military Regime Before the Institutional Act N. 5

Strictly speaking, the first measures taken in the Acts of the Revolution Supreme Command, between April 9 and 13, 1964, before President Castello Branco’s assumption, already indicated the priority given to the military sector, when 186 officers, of this segment, were removed from their careers, out of a total of 353.²

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² For the conflict between ethics, and for the data related to the political, parliamentary and popular supports, refer to PINTO (2017).

² The sums of the cassations arising from the governmental measures were made by the author based
The weight of these sanctions, initially, collapsed on those considered communists, radical leftists, populists or members of the toppled government (KLEIN, FIGUEIREDO, 1978; ALVES, 1987; VASCONCELOS, 2010).

After the National Congress had approved a Law that established indirect elections to the Brazilian Presidency, old dream of the elites, Castello Branco was elected with 361 of 388 votes (VIANA FILHO, 1975) of the congressmen and assumed its government imbued with a reformist, civilist and legalistic spirit, although it was under the aegis of Institutional Act n. 1 (henceforth IA-1), (SILVA, MELLO, GRUNEWALD, 1964) its authoritarian bias, which should last twenty months. Coherent with his ideas, exposed under the pseudonym of Colonel Y (BRANCO, 1933a, 1933b, 1933c, 1633d, 1933e, 1933f, 1933g, 1933h, 1933i, 1933j), he looked for the construction of professional Armed Forces, which, among other characteristics, should move away from politics.

The new President, however, was not satisfied with these first activities of debugging the military tissue and began a process of long-term reforms. Just three months after assuming the presidency, he passed through Congress the Constitutional Amendment n. 9, of July 22, 1964 (BRASIL, 1964a), whose art. 138, sole paragraph, transferred to military inactivity those who occupied political positions, who, up to that time, had carried out such activities outside the service, in constant comings and goings from the barracks.

In the Law n. 4,448, of October 29, 1964 (BRASIL, 1964b), that aimed at restoring the supremacy of merit and professional values over political interference, the promotions of Army officers were initially regulated, which ones, lately, would be extended to the other Armed Forces. Over time, until the end of that regime, such a mentality would, more and more solidify. About this regulation, should still be highlighted the promotions by choice, which ones affected the senior officers and generals, under the exclusive scrutiny of a (most senior) Officials Promotions Committee of each single force, without political interference. Similar regulations would be established for the enlisted. Under these measures, interference by politicians in the military career was restricted.

The Law n. 4,902, of December 16, 1965 (BRASIL, 1965a), so called the Law of Retirement, embodied the perspective unveiled with the Constitutional Amendment n. 9. In addition to extinguishing the rank of marshal, a fact that almost reached the Minister of War, entered into important considerations, since, for the first time, set limits for the permanence in the highest ranks. Until that time, the generals had no deadlines to remain on active duty. This situation tended to constitute and reinforce leaderships, who, in the previous framework, of full involvement with politics,

on the records contained in the documents in references: (MINISTÉRIO DA AERONÁUTICA (Brasil), [197-a], [197-b]).
guarantee them along with political-partisan segments and empowered them to constitute caudals with numerous followers, whose desiderata were not those of the military appanage, but ones originated from the political vocation (PINTO, 2017).

The Law n. 4,902 (BRASIL, 1965a) also had an important impact on the military personnel who exercised political activity, although nonpartisan, including the enlisted. This, because it increased from twenty-five to thirty years the length of service. By granting those who had attained the first requisite the transition to retirement, with all the rights stemming from previous post-war legislation, including the promotion of two ranks above and the correspondent earnings, made it possible for its members, who acted politically or sympathized with the modus vivendi of the previous period, voluntarily left active service.

Under the conditions existing in his administration – constitutionals, deriving from the institutional, legal and regulatory acts – Castello Branco had a large arsenal of measures that could be adopted in order to achieve its main objective in the military sphere: the withdrawal of the military from the disseminated participation in politics as institution, in groups or individually. Available measures included: cassation; transfer to the remunerated reserve or definitive retirement; individual and collective enframement in prescriptions contained in laws, decrees and regulations; career format in order to exclude undesirables; negative of promotions, particularly for the highest ranks; exclusion from political-partisan interference; penal or administrative punishments, supported in the disciplinary regulations of the singular forces; negative in extension of duty periods, mainly for the beginnings ranks; among others.

With such instruments in hands, thousands of remnants from the previous period would be reached (KLEIN, FIGUEIREDO, 1978; ALVES, 1987; VASCONCELOS, 2010) or would leave, voluntarily, the military service, as a result of the new regulations. At the same time, the bases for an extinction of two of the main political influences on the Armed Forces were laid: the partisan and the ideological. Castello Branco pointed to the general direction of the movement, inexorable, in the direction of the military’s departure from politics, begun with the purges in the most active segments of the left, but would also reach, lately, the right (ARGOLO, RIBEIRO, FORTUNATO, 1996; ARGOL, FORTUNATO, 2004; CHIRIÓ, 2012).

Two areas were considered very sensitive: the Vila Militar, in Rio de Janeiro, because of its critical mass of power, able to initiate and maintain seditious movements, and for its historical participation in politics; and military academies and schools. Castello Branco faced numerous crises, many of which originated from these sectors. Even so, he would not give up his guidance. Amid one of these instabilities, in one of the most politically active institutions, the Battalion Level Planning School (henceforth BLPS, to Army Captains), at Vila Militar, pointed out:

Now, it seems to me that I am permitted to speak to you and even to ask you what your position is. Will it be one of solidarity with the Government? No. Because the Army is not a political party to show solidarity with the
Government or whoever it is. Those who have the right to show solidarity have the right to also present disapproval. Does the Government expect your support? No. The National Army is not an association to express here, there and there, its support for this or that element because it will also have the right to deny its help. [...] Unhappy is the Army that must be in their positions of combat to give support or solidarity to the governors or the opposition. Bastard [sic] is the government who waits for this solidarity and support [...] (VIANA FILHO, 1975, p. 97).

In spite of his convictions, Castello Branco would be hampered, in the political dimension, by vectors that would constitute a true paradoxical tri-polarity, which engulfed his government and the following in several short circuits and, at least twice, almost knocked him down, occasions that would be well demarcated by the issuance of Institutional Act n. 2 (henceforth IA-2) (BRANCO, 1965) and IA-5 (BRASIL, 1968), as will be explained below.

Refers, in the first pole, to the hostility of the “revolutionaries” towards the communists and leftists in general, identified as threats to the continuity of the regime and to the desired depoliticization of the armed faction, which was embodied in the constraints, persecution and exclusion of its militants (KLEIN, FIGUEIREDO, 1978; ALVES, 1987; VASCONCELOS, 2010); in the second, to the radicalization of the leftist segment, aiming the regime at the corner and, if possible, its overthrow, for the purpose of which it erected a network of power capable of instituting significant “resistances” (FOUCAULT, 2007), whose climax would occur with the outbreak of armed struggle (MELLO, 1979; MACIEL, NASCIMENTO, 2012); and in the third of the polarities, to the challenge posed by the hard line and the radicals of the right, whose actions were sometimes opposed to the left or to the rulers, sometimes, indirectly, added to one or the another, attitude which provoked the reaction of the latter towards their suppressions (ARGOLO, RIBEIRO, FORTUNATO, 1996; ARGOLO, FORTUNATO, 2004; CHIRIÓ, 2012).

As stated above, the first of these centers of tension was extirpated from the interior of the Armed Forces at the very beginning of the “revolutionary” process, with rare foci remaining, such as the communist cell of Captain Carlos Lamarca and Sergeant Darcy Rodrigues, in the 4th Regiment of Infantry, Quitaúna, São Paulo (MACIEL, NASCIMENTO, 2012, p. 305). Despite this, several elements, radical or not, remained in action, keeping the first pole active and contributing to the enlargement of the second, which one would structure the resistance of the left, configured, mainly, in three vectors of greater duration: in parliamentary radicalism, academic/student militancy and in the armed struggle.

The third of these tension poles came from the interior of the armed segment and was oriented in two main tendencies: 1) from the hard line: in the permanence of the proposal to hardening the regime; and in the thesis of “military sovereignty”, the “rulers as delegates” of the revolution, the “opinion of the barracks” and in the political participation of the military; and 2) the right radicals: through infiltration into
the intelligence system; extremism and terrorism; 3) in both: in the thesis of the “autonomous forces”, able to impose the revolutions imagined by the diverse currents of thought that supported the CMM/64 (ARGOLO, RIBEIRO, FORTUNATO, 1996; ARGOL0, FORTUNATO, 2004; CHIRIÓ, 2012).

Arthur da Costa e Silva, Castello Branco’s successor, took over without exception instruments, due to the revocation of IA-2, and continued the enframement process initiated by his predecessor. In the strictly military field, the political, military and administrative measures adopted previously, untouched and deepened, began to take effect.

One of the most notable was the sudden disappearance of the protagonism of junior, intermediary - with the exception of BLPS - and senior officers. Soldiers, sailors, corporals, sergeants, warrants officers and sub officials, after harsh repression, faded from the political scene. And, also, officer’s and enlisted’s Military Clubs. At the same time, however, was observed increasing participation of the generals (CHIRIÓ, 2012, p. 134). The meaning of this phenomenon is directly related to the reestablishment of order, hierarchy, discipline and rules of precedence, in a clearly more homogeneous environment, scrubbed from left and right radicals, these being scalded by prisons, transfers and purges; and endowed with mechanisms capable of eliminating any political, administrative or disciplinary divergence.

However, new actors presented themselves, among ones, the Army Information Center (AIC), inaugurated in July 1967, in Ministry Aurelio de Lyra Tavares’s administration, which one was not restricted to mere information gathering, such as the National Information Service (NIS), and advanced to an active operational posture, which would sprout new and widespread radical shoots (ARGOLO, RIBEIRO, FORTUNATO, 1996; ARGOL0, FORTUNATO, 2004). Costa e Silva faced several challenges: from a reorganized left in the parliament, in the academic and student area and in the establishment of the armed struggle. The latter, in a remarkable event, carried out an attack at Recife airport against this general, then candidate to the Presidency, who did not succeed by chance, despite causing death and injury, among them a Navy admiral (MELLO, 1979, p. 355).

Based on the government’s intelligence agencies, the Secretary-General of the National Security Council presented an assessment with informative elements from the entire National Information System, stating that the communist agitation plan was very thorough; had the support of the leftist deputies who, using their immunities, inflated the mobilization; and received foreign support; all with the aim of weakening the government, leading it to the debacle (MELLO, 1979, p. 564). Communist “unarmed” action did as many or more effect than the armed struggle. The option of the Brazilian Communist Party to seize power by means of mobilization was not unrealistic. The lefts gathered in a parliamentary, academics, students front and in the armed struggle would lead the intelligence agencies to consider that “[…] a process of revolutionary war was developing in the country, that is, the struggle of factions of the
population committed to take power, to implant a new social order, based on the marxist-leninist ideology to which these factions were converted [...]” (MACIEL, NASCIMENTO, 2012, p. 334).

The hard line, in turn, made explicit its thesis: in June 1967, Colonel Rui Castro (1967), director of the Army Library, proposed that “[...] military thinking in the position of great mute is a thing of the past [...]”; (CASTRO, 1967, p. 1) and together with Colonel Boaventura, in the same month, asked the Army Minister “[...] to protest against the obstacles to political participation”; a context in which “the official gets rid of hierarchical intermediaries – claims, moreover, a direct channel of access to the president and accuses his direct superiors of betraying his thought – while, at the same time, acknowledge the ministerial authority [...]” (CHIRIÓ, 2012, p. 102).

The Ministerial Notice n. 212, of July 11, 1967, (MINISTÉRIO DO EXÉRCITO (Brasil), 1967b, p. 1) brought the answer, considering that such a proposal consisted, among other reasons, a practice “[...] condemnable to morals and discipline [...]” that affected “[...] the principles of ethics, loyalty, obedience to standards [...] and the good name of the class [...]”; recommending, after all, that no more petitions should be forwarded to cabinet or government authorities without going through the hierarchical channels.

Just as on the left, the radical right-wing movements expanded, which began to function within the intelligence organs. Many of the militants, from then on, would be egressed from the information organs, particularly the AIC, integration that would greatly facilitate recruitment, data collection and targeting. According to Maud Chirió (2012), different from the hard-line performance in the previous phase “It is no longer a matter of directing power, but of acting in its shadow, in flagrant contradiction with the apolitical requirement of the officers who, nevertheless, the Executive tries for four years to restore to its own advantage [...]” (CHIRIÓ, 2012, p. 125).

On the left, on July 3, “[...] dozens of students carrying machine guns, rifles, revolvers and molotov cocktails occupied the Faculties of Law, Philosophy and Economy of the University of São Paulo (USP), making threats of placement of bombs and imprisonment of generals” (MACIEL, NASCIMENTO, 2012, p. 271). This event, together with the following, the “Fifty Thousand Rally”, on July 4, 1968, successor to the previous one, of the “Hundred Thousand”, both occurring in Rio de Janeiro, would clearly mark the bifurcation of the student movement: in the descent of the mobilization and on the road to the armed struggle of the most radical.

The leftist turmoil, whose climax occurred with the speech of the congressman Márcio Moreira Alves, in the context of student conflict at the University of Brasilia, with injuries among police and students, plus the pressures and constraints of the hard line and the radicals, new troops uprisings and military reactions, would lead Costa e Silva, under threat of coup or dethronement, to the IA-5 edition on December 13,
1968 (MELLO, 1979, p. 647).

The Civil and Military Regime during the Institutional Act n. 5

In spite of the proclaimed intentions of democratization from Castello Branco and Costa e Silva as well, Brazil entered the darkest period of the entire authoritarian stage, influenced by the resulting of the right and left radicalizations. This last president also attempted to issue a Constitutional Amendment in order to revoke the IA-5 and obtain the instruments that would allow him to face the oncoming storms. It was known as A Constituição que não foi [The Constitution that was not] (VIEIRA, 2002).

On May 19, 1969, a hard-line military exponent was reached by the cassations: Colonel Francisco Boaventura Cavalcanti Junior, whose accompanying justification to the act accused him of “[...] divorcing himself from the military’s fundamental duties by taking a stand incompatible with the status of active Senior Army Officer and with the basic norms of the Armed Forces organization [...]” (BRASIL, 1969a, p. 4.238-9). The affair would have ended thus, were not the Army General Augusto César Moniz de Aragão, in the same chain of thought, had taken the defense of Boaventura.

The question provided the opportunity to untie one of the knots that haunted the thinking of many military personnel, including those of the highest hierarchical levels, in this case, whether military rulers would be delegates of a military will, or yet, to whom belongs the legitimacy of the government: if to the Armed Forces, the implicit thesis of military sovereignty, to the barracks or to the people and their institutions. Moniz de Aragão, by means of a letter to the Minister of the Army, under the pretext of defending Boaventura, but seeking to establish his leadership in the “military opinion”, strengthens his position. When he did not obtain the desired answer, he held a meeting in the General Provisioning Department that led and criticized the presidential circle, which were transcribed in a new letter addressed to his superior and distributed in several commands, in military schools, Congress and even, in diplomatic representations (MELLO, 1979, p. 765-777; CHIRIÓ, 2012, p. 140).

In this missive, the author explained the essential question: “Armed Forces officers, because they feel responsible for the revolutionary regime, understand that they have the right and duty not only to inspect and appreciate the acts of the Government, which imagine its creature, if they disagree with him [...]” (CHAGAS, 1979, p. 99). It was the persisting idea that, since the outset of the movement, the

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8 On December 12, 1968, following the refusal to continue the action in the Federal Supreme Court against Representative [Deputado Federal] Márcio Moreira Alves, resulting from the vote in Congress, Minister of the Army Lyra Tavares received in his office, in Rio de Janeiro, numerous generals stationed in the city, occasion in which was embarrassed by some. On that occasion, Army General Moniz de Aragão, affirmed, under the silence of the others that “[...] if the President is hesitating, then it must be overcome [...]” a clear allusion to the coup, to which Tavares replied, “[...] that he could do, but without the Minister.” (MELLO, 1979, p. 647).
ruler would be a delegate of military opinion, whatever that might be, or even had existed. General Antônio Carlos Muricy, Army Chief of Staff, “[...] like Lyra, interprets Aragão’s speech as legitimating a collective control of the barracks over the government. For the former, this denotes an ‘attempt to diminish governmental authority’.” (CHIRIÓ, 2012, p. 141). The political and the military vocations were in crash (PINTO, 2017). So, the Army Minister presented the only viable solution. In a meeting of the High Command on the Aragão Case, this raises the question:

The assertion of an Army General, in the sense that it is up to the officers of the Armed Forces to supervise the acts of the Government and even remove it from power if they disagree, would provoke, as it is already being done, the demolishing question of the Revolution: What about the people? And the Producing Classes? And Class Unions? And the other Powers of the Republic? (MINISTÉRIO DO EXÉRCITO (Brasil), 1967a, p. 2).

The argument was balancing on the razor’s edge, since that the Congress was closed, but it meant that the regime had not renounced to democratic references and did not accept the setback for the political-military entanglement. To Moniz de Aragão’s surprise, the reaction of the Army Generals was of repulsion. At the same time, they mortgaged their support to the Minister of the Army, and advocated for an unprecedented exclusion High Command’s member, which was done. He would also lose his position, remaining without function until the next government (CHIRIÓ, 2012, p. 141).

On August 29, 1969, President Arthur da Costa e Silva suffered the first heart stroke, which would make him unable to govern and would take him to death less than four months later; a fact that created a greater risk for the project of withdrawal of the military from politics and weakened the regime, due to its dependence on the cohesion of the military. Any fissure could turn a fracture and end up in a collapse. This, because the Military Junta, which took power, by eliding the constitutional forecast for presidential succession, assuming the presidential prerogatives, reinstated political activity within the Armed Forces, set off the succession process without clear rules and dependent on regional and sectoral interpretations, measures that provoked reactions and indiscipline.

Ernesto de Mello Batista, Fleet Admiral, one of those who rebelled, who held the highest rank of the Brazilian Navy (four stars), led to the edition of Institutional Act n. 17 (BRASIL, 1969b), whose purpose was to reinforce the hierarchical chain in the prerogative of decide the succession. He ended up in jail and transferred to retirement. In that document, the emphasis of the enframement was emphasized, which one, after reiterating the principles of hierarchy and discipline, made explicit:

Art. 1 The President of the Republic may transfer to the reserve, for a specified period, military personnel who have attempted, or come to intent, fully evidenced, against the cohesion of the armed forces, by divorce, for reasons of a conjunctural or political objectives by personal or group order, from basic
principles and of the forehead purposes of its constitutional destination. (BRASIL, 1969b, p. 1).

The message was clear: not even an officer occupying the highest rank of the hierarchy was exempt from complying with the orders issued by superiors, especially when emanating from supreme commanders. In the two turbulent months of Military Junta rule, military cohesion was put to the test as never before; the political and the military vocation were one step away from the unlikely fusion; the achievements of Castello Branco and Costa e Silva stayed in the edge, because the political ebullition in the troop, caused by the kidnapping of the United States Ambassador and presidential succession, resurrected the autonomist spirit of the lower ranks of the hierarchy that, at the time of the problem with the President, were already properly controlled.

Finally, a consensus was reached with the nomination and election of Emílio Garrastazu Médici. For good and evil, under the shadow of 1A-S and other regulations, the new government inherited a political, legal, institutional and military apparatus whose structure had greater coherence, harmony and convergence than those of its predecessors. Such instruments of power, even repressive, available to the President of the Republic allowed, for the first time, the unilateral imposition of governmental decisions, that is, on the military, office party, oppositionists, citizenship and guerrilla hosts. In the military scope, the respectful and harmonious coexistence of the President with the Military Ministers, particularly with the Minister of the Army, General Orlando Geisel, restored the course of the regime, shaken in the period of the Military Junta, towards the military’s withdrawal from politics. Right at the beginning of the government, that minister, in a meeting with the Army High Command, clearly stated the new level that had been achieved:

Like it or not, we’re in politics. The general often has to pretend that he is not involved in anything, that he takes care of only the professional part, but the general, of course, has to meddle in the political part; go in it by the backstage [...]. Captain, major, colonel, and the brigadier himself must stop doing politics; policy is only at the highest echelons.9 (apud GASPARI, 2002, p. 137).

In another dimension, on June 14, 1971, an episode occurred involving the hard line of the Brazilian Air Force, represented by the Minister himself, Marshal of the Air Márcio de Souza and Mello, and right-wing radicals acting in the repression. It was the death of Stuart Angel Jones, radical leftist militiant, active in the Revolutionary Movement 8 of October (MR-8), the same that kidnapped the US Ambassador. Captured by members of the Aeronautical Safety Information Center (ASIC), directly subordinate to Souza and Mello, disappeared, after being taken to the premises of the General Headquarters of the 3rd Air Zone, whose commander was Major Brigadier João Paulo Moreira Burnier, known rightist radical; and the indications pointing to the responsibility, albeit indirectly, for this and six other ASIC officers (CHIRIÔ, 2012, p. 178).

9 Minutes of the 48th Meeting of the Army High Command (apud GASPARI, 2002).
This fact displeased the President of the Republic, who, in a dispatch on the list of generals to be promoted in December in the Air Force, discord with the inclusion of those involved in the episode of Stuart Angel, which generated a disagreement with the Minister of the Aeronautics, leading him to retirement by the President action. According to Burnier:

This misunderstanding provoked a real change in the orientation of the presidency of the Republic in relation to the revolutionary officers of the Aeronautics and that was when they began really the collapse of the officiality that had taken part of the Revolution of 64 that began to be ignored in the promotions. (BURNIER, 2005, Tape 9B - Final).

Subsequently, in compliance with the statutory determinations, implemented by Castello Branco, of mandatory renewal, each year, of 25% of the officers in active service upon election by the Commissions of Officers Promotions of the singles forces, submitted to the President of the Republic, on December 31, 1971, Burnier was not promoted, being compulsorily conducted to retirement, as well as other officers of his closest circle from the intelligence area (CHIRIÓ, 2012, p. 179). Medici’s attitude toward these self-seeking tendencies conveyed the understanding to the political and military circles that the President of the Republic had used the event to send a clear message against the articulation between hard-line military commanders and right radicals that would not condone with such posture, at least in the military sphere, an attitude that reinforced the line of commanders who did not accept excesses, but logically, pushed the radicals into clandestinity (the holds) (CHIRIÓ, 2012, p. 179).

His successor, Ernesto Geisel, assumed under the auspices of the “Decompression”, which one would be subjected to new challenges, since the convergence of objectives between the oppositions and the rulers, under the new rhythm, broke the harmony that had been established in the previous government among moderates, hard liners and radicals, this time, putting the political skeleton of the enframement, again, into test. In addition, moderate and opposition radicals disagreed with the pace of withdrawal. Brazil was preparing for the democratic struggle, and the various segments began their actions to return to the scene. In this context, two events have become remarkable and illustrate the challenges facing the new course and the military’s disengagement with politics.

Since the creation of the Operations and Investigation Deployments Centers/Internal Defense Operations (OIDC/IDO), replications of the structure of the Operation Bandeirantes (OBAN), there have been reports of torture by these agencies, without firm measures being taken to clear and restrain them. In the first autonomous excesses of the intelligence community, in the case of the Air Force, when Médici confronted them, there was displacement of the repressive activities to clandestine areas of operation. Geisel, at least formally, stood head-on against any deviation of conduct from those agencies. He “[...] makes the struggle against the excesses and indiscipline of the repressive organs one of the main elements of authoritarian decompression; element present since the inaugural discourse of distension [...]”
However, after the guerrillas’ disbanding, the intelligence agencies, without an enemy for their self-justification as a relevant activity, began to repress the activities of the communist parties in the underground. Thus, on October 24, 1975, the journalist and communist militant Vladimir Herzog, after a campaign in the Legislative Assembly of the State of São Paulo against the activities that he carried out in the Culture Television, was summoned to provide clarification in (OIDC/IDO) of the II Army, in São Paulo, commanded by Army General Ednardo D’Ávila Mello, anti-communist hardliner.

On the following day, he voluntarily went to those premises, where after being questioned, he died, and the investigations were later confirmed in Military Police Inquiry (henceforth MPI) and supported by expert criminal reports, concluded by his suicide. His fellow inmates alleged that they had heard requests for instruments for torture. The rabbi, who performed his funeral, would also have seen signs of violence in his body. In the same context, of diligence to investigate the actions of the Brazilian Communist Party (BCP), on January 17, 1976, the worker, Manoel Fiel Filho, was arrested, interrogated and died in the same (OIDC/IDO) premises in circumstances similar to those scored by Vladimir Herzog (BRASIL, 1999).

The MPI, established to investigate the matter in thirty days, after concluding that it was a suicide case, was referred to the Military Court, whose attorney-in-charge requested its filing on the grounds that “The evidence established is sufficient and robust to convince us of the hypothesis suicide of Manoel Fiel Filho [...]” (BRASIL, 1999, p. 4). It was clearly a challenge from the radicals and from the hard line to the direction established by the President of the Republic. For the then Governor of the State of São Paulo, in testimony to the Municipal Truth Commission of São Paulo, a person trusted by the President, it was “[...] a plan to take Geisel out of power, [...]” adding, “[...] having witnessed a Geisel’s meeting with military leaders after the death of the former, in which Geisel said that he would no longer tolerate this type of crime in the Army’s dependencies [...]” (COSTA, 2013).

Geisel did not hesitate. Although the conclusions of the MPIs were endorsed by the Military Justice, he determined the exoneration of the Commander of the II Army, kept his promises and sent one more eloquent signal to the hard line and the radicals. After this, “No political prisoner dies more under torture in Brazilian prisons after Manoel Fiel Filho.” As of 1977, “[...] no murder or political disappearance of a Brazilian citizen on national soil is more recorded [...]” (CHIRIÓ, 2012, p. 186-7). In the second episode, the challenge came from Army Minister Sylvio Couto Coelho da Frota, a hard-nosed anti-communist and hard-line representative.

Frota (2006), on several occasions, presented disagreements with the highest ruler and his collaborators. However, the most threatening of his positions was the resurrection of the idea that the President would be a delegate of military opinion (FROTA, 2006). The notion had been made explicit by the Radical Democratic League.
(Lider), extinguished, together with the Anticommunist Movement (MAC), in November of 1965, for its radical right activities (MANIFESTO [...] 1965, p. 4),\textsuperscript{10} ideas, later, exhibited by the General Moniz de Aragão. In the state of hierarchical and disciplinary centralization of that time, as already stated, for vaguer and indeterminate that was this notion, it would correspond to the components of the High Commands of the branches, standing out, naturally, the Army, whose supreme interpreters would be the ministers military and, \textit{primus inter pares}, Frota itself.

Geisel perceived, behind the thesis of that minister, the intention to repeat the journey that had ended with the imposition of the candidacy of Marshal Costa e Silva, and now the regime needed to pursue another course than that. When observing the inclination of Geisel by the then head of the National Information Service (NIS), General João Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo, to be his successor, Sylvio Frota decided to pave his own candidacy. As a result, in 1977, a “frotist” group was formed in the National Renewal Alliance, the office party.

Frota, of course, could articulate the receipt of support for its thesis by the High Command, which would not be difficult to obtain, since, in addition to the disagreements with the presidential decisions by hardliners and radicals, the preferred was not a four stars general, the stony clause of that collegiate, and, on the calendar stage, he could not reach that post until the election without to overcome the competitors in the active, which would displease others by the loss of his favourites.

The futurology of the past would say that Frota, with the endorsement of his generals, could impose conditions on the President, or do worse, as Paulo Egydio said. Faced with these difficulties, Geisel decided to dismiss Sylvio Frota, on October 12, 1977, a Sunday. In an event led by the Chief of the Military Cabinet, General Hugo de Abreu, in the middle of Brasília airport, in front of the automobiles sent by the Army Minister to catch the generals who arrived for a meeting convened by him, made an invitation from the President of the Republic to meet that ruler, managing to divert them from their destiny.

After the generals’ accession, Geisel fired his minister, along with his faithful followers, such as: the Chief of the AIC, General Antonio Silva Campos (FROTA, 2006, p. 529-530), the General General Ademir Fuíza de Castro, founder of this agency (SOARES; D’ARAUJO, CASTRO, 1995, p. 197); Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Alberto Brasilhante Ustra, Chief of the AIC Operations Section; (GASPARI, 2016, p. 22) sixty unit commanders (ROTINA [...], 1977, p. 4), in addition to his theses and possibilities of regression in the framing process. Such attitudes inaugurated a new stage in the confrontation of the hard line and in the containment of the radicals. The logical consequence was the rupture of the synergy between these two segments, since the

\textsuperscript{10} According to which “[... the Head of the Government is nothing more than a Delegate of the Supreme Command of the Revolution and, consequently, cannot act in any hypothesis contrary to the revolutionary ideals that have surpassed to the own Constitution [...]” (MANIFESTO [...], 1965, p. 4).
former lost the instrumental use of the latter, as a mechanism of pressure on the regime and as a support for the leadership they exercised over the more conservative segments. The resumption of the convergence of course between a government that wanted to institutionalize its relations with the Armed Forces in general and the Army in particular, while reinforcing the symbolic figures of its ministers, removed from military commanders of areas, that is, army commanders, the autonomy they have always held, at least on matters with political repercussions.

From that time on, new limits of tolerance were drawn, narrower than those espoused by Orlando Geisel at his celebrated meeting. They were the last links of the hierarchical circles that were missing to be framed. However, there were still the functional and personal links represented by the right-wing radicals operating in the basements near the upper echelons.

**The Civil and Military Regime After the Institutional Act n. 5**

The last of the military rulers, João Batista de Oliveira Figueiredo, took over in March 31, 1979, under more democratic conditions, once the instrument of exception (IA-5) had been revoked. With the current *Magna Carta*, several politicians from the left, including radicals, would be elected in 1982, a condition that had not existed since the Communist Party’s extinction in 1947, by Eurico Gaspar Dutra. However, the hard line had not lost the hope of resuming its protagonism, since it had followers, including in the high hierarchy, particularly in the Army. One of them was Gentil Marcondes Filho, Commander of the I Army in the first two years of João Figueiredo’s government. Precisely in Rio de Janeiro one of the focuses of radicalism. In his résumé appeared that he was Chief of Staff of Ednardo D’Ávila Mello on the occasion of the deaths of Vladimir Herzog and Manoel Fiel Filho, to whom OIDC/IDO was subordinate.

At the time, under the auspices of several radical right-wing groups, numerous attacks were made before the climax in Riocentro (ALVES, 1987, p. 279-280; ARGOLLO, RIBEIRO, FORTUNATO, 1996). This last episode, which was launched on April 30, 1981, was not carried out, it is admitted, due to the amateurism and the inability of its agents, although demonstrating the recurrence of collusion between the organs in charge of repression, meaning OIDC/IDO, and high military structure, in the case, the Command of the I Army and radical elements in the clandestinity.

Its clear purpose was to hinder the continuity of the Decompression, particularly in the important step of party reform and the general elections of 1982, and to try to repeat the play of Costa e Silva and Sylvio Frota in the sense of a possible continuity of the regime. Surrounded by negotiations with the radical groups, including the Head of the Central Agency of the NIS, General Newton Cruz, the Inquiry, according to the unanimity of the time, then confirmed by testimonies and historical research, consisted of gross fraud; and “[…] those responsible for the terrorist attacks would not be prosecuted and tried; in turn, the hard-line sectors would accept electoral politics and would no longer oppose the holding of elections in November

The agreement removed hard-liners support for right-wing terrorism, while ensuring that the investigation would not be deepened, which would certainly reach military personnel from the highest ranks of the active hierarchy – this time embedded not so much in command, but at the heart of the intelligence system, read AIC and NIS – and in retirement (ALVES, 1987, p. 280). It was the last stone that needed to be removed from the political involvement of the military, by that time massively collected in their military activities and removed from politics, a path which the remaining radical elements refused to follow, blown up by hardliners with intentions of remain in power.

At the close of the government, in the last military governance, the project to withdrawal this segment from the disseminated action in politics was well advanced in consonance with those abstract lines delineated in the Enframement Antimodel; that is, at the end of this phase, no sector of the military structure acted politically, in the sense of ideological involvement, partisan, or as activists, either individually or collectively, except for those, that for duty obligation, would conduct the two-faced cross: the military ministers.

The military hard line was extinguished as articulated power, leaving isolated individuals, and collusions between commandos and clandestine (in the holds), was halted through negotiation, despite some recurrences of the radical right, which, out of repulsion by most military and insignificance, did not impact the progress achieved. The next government would have to face political, economic and social challenges, no longer military activists, due to they were, for the first time in the Republic, out of politics.

**The Synthesis: Civilian Objective Control**

The COC consists in one of the possibilities of a “system” that encompasses the CMR as a whole, that is, a larger structure including multiple configurations, like the CSC, for example. The essence of this structure lies in the basilar notion of “equilibrium” and not in that of control, as it is commonly understood, being it in the sense of powers (civilian and military), or arising from homeostasis. Because of the various criteria that impact this balancing, and in accordance with Samuel P. Huntington, it can occur in endless forms. The complete framework of this structure, extracted from *The Soldier and the State*, in the perspective of this author, as fully explained in Pinto (2016, 2019), is represented below.

**Table 1: Theoretical Structure of Civil-Military Relations Balance**

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<th>Conservative and Compatible Principles of Military Professionalism</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Function of the Institutions © Society or Military</th>
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**Note:** The table represents the relative influence and control of the military in society, including the degree of professionalism, command, and organizational aspects. The impact of ideological and social forces on military institutions is also considered.
For Samuel P. Huntington (1996), the COC, shaded in Table 1 above, should be “[...] one that maximizes military security [...]” in society, and be understood as corresponding to the standard military mentality: realistic and conservative (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 17). But it doesn’t exist isolated, reason for what is fundamental to understand, even if graphically, its context. In principle, such emanations are to be visualized from three nodal points, each subjected to two spheres of tension opposite each to other, one civil and another military.

By using this criterion of analysis, one could verify the degree to which the CMR increases or decreases the military and national security of the society. More than this, using it as a parameter would be “possible to suggest changes in the component elements of the system” needed to bring it closer to equilibrium (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 17). Therefore, the COC would configure the ideal relationship form, one that maximizes military professionalism, away from politics, in opposition to the various manifestations of the Civilian Subjective Control (CSC) tendencies in institutional, class or constitutional politics.

The essence of this model would be the “[...] recognition of autonomous military professionalism [...]” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 102); that is to say, a military sphere functionally, although not politically, independent. Instead of mirrors of civilian groups representing the State, they would be direct instruments of that same structure in the accomplishment of its primordial activity of providing security to the society. Huntington (1996) states that the military should be made politically sterile, neutral, professionals, in order to achieve the goal of minimizing the power of the military in relation to civilian groups, because “A highly professional officer corps remains ready to fulfil the wishes of a civilian group holding legitimate authority within the State [...]” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 99). However, “Any other reduction of military power, beyond the point where professionalism is maximized, only benefits a particular civil group and serves only to enhance the power of this group in its struggle with other civilian groups [...]” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 99). According to this author:

The distribution of political power that most facilitates military professionalism is therefore also the lowest point to which military power can be reduced without posing as a favourite among civilian groups. By virtue of this, the objective definition of civilian control provides a singular and concrete pattern of politically neutral civil control that all social groups can recognize. (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 99)

Furthermore, there should be a single source of recognized legitimate authority, otherwise “Where there are conflicting authorities or ideas as to who holds authority, professionalism becomes difficult and even impossible to achieve [...]”
In this context, constitutional ideologies and class or governmental loyalties would be included, which would place “considerations and political values” above the military. In addition, personal loyalties would gain greater importance for political bodies than professional competence (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 53-54).

This exposed, in order to make operational the segment of interest in this study, extracted from the Theoretical Structure of Civil and Military Relations Balance, the Table 2, below, proposes additions of the military and national security, and autonomy – not mentioned in Table 1 – in order to explain, together with the core of the COC (professionalism), these two other aspects, fundamentals for the analysis of the convergence of this paradigm with the conditions reached at the end of the CMR/64. In the same way, in spite of it didn’t take part of Huntington’s (1996) system, the internal security is incorporated, due to its importance in the Brazilian case, where caused significant impact in all CMR/64, for reasons previously explained.

Table 2: Qualitative Evaluation of the Degree of Adherence of the CMR in Brazil to the CCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERION</th>
<th>SUBCRITERION</th>
<th>PARAMETERS</th>
<th>BEFORE 1964</th>
<th>BEFORE IA-5</th>
<th>DURING IA-5</th>
<th>AFTER IA-5</th>
<th>IN 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY</td>
<td>EXTERNAL</td>
<td>FOREIGN INTERFERENCE</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTERNAL</td>
<td>CONFLICTS</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>ALTA</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFESSIONALISM</td>
<td>NEUTRALITY</td>
<td>STERILIZATION LEVEL</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIERARCHY</td>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>MÉDIO</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DISCIPLINE</td>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COOPERATION</td>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<td></td>
<td>COMAND</td>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COHESION</td>
<td>TRADITION, SPIRIT OF CORPS, UNITY, COMMUNITY</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>AVERAGE TO HIGH</td>
<td>AVERAGE TO HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACQUIESCENCE TO THE CIVILIAN POWER (EXECUTIVE)</td>
<td>MILITARY SUBORDINATION TO THE POLITICAL POWER</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOYALTY</td>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<td></td>
<td>OBEEDIENCE</td>
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<td>LOW</td>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
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Having followed the process under study, by means of the evolution of the Enframement Antimodel, this final qualitative evaluation – whose concordance (shaded) is made for each period with the first column –, related to the criteria above mentioned, seek to explain the adherence of the Brazilian military to the assumptions of Huntington (1996) for the COC, including the functional autonomy, summoned in its consequences for military and national security, in its internal and external physiognomies. This static evaluation will naturally undergo changes with the incorporation of the civil dynamics to the process, which, although excluded from this assessment, may magnify or minimize the effects above estimated.

Final Remarks

As stated in the exordial proposal, this article sought to present a portion of research motivated by the initially empirical observation that Brazilian society has been living, for a long time, with the abstention of participation in politics from the military (in active service), notably through state coups, as it had prevailed until that March 31, 1964. In order to answer the question of what would have caused such a result, the assumption was made that there was notable interference during the CMR/64 aimed at suppressing the widespread armed forces participation in politics, leading the military rulers to adopt continued attitudes to remove these, until then, characteristics.

From the analysis of the CMR, since the CMM/64 until its end in 1985, the consistency of a dialectical trajectory was verified, which, from the Moderator Model, underwent the intrusion of an antithesis, backed by countless measures carried out for military rulers in a long process, theoretically represented in a structure called Enframement Antimodel, whose final result approached the Brazilian military of the characteristics proposed by Huntington (1996) in the COC. According to the new model, following the understanding presented here, the Armed Forces would accept the condition of grand muet and they would return to their activities in the barracks.

This implemented modification that led the process to converge with the Second Point of Equilibrium (COC) and, in the ideological segment, with the First Point of Equilibrium (of the realistic and conservative mentality), worked to remove the armed segment from the politics, making them more professional, a result that impacted the CMR entire building and reinforced the formal and informal vertices of military authority.

Source: Based on Huntington (1996).
In consequence, the civilian government, of the so called “New Republic”, inherit the CMR restored in its core values, situation that provided the possibility of a change in the direction of the Brazilian democracy, in the sense of its political development would be free from armed guardianship and could take care with its own improvement. But was not what has been seeing in the civilian side of the relation, allowing approaching a final conjecture, deserving of greater scientific explorations: what are the effects of this change on the civilian side of the political system and on democracy in Brazil?

It can be observed that while the military subsystem, in its dialectical evolution, acquired characteristics that brought it closer to the military structures of advanced democracies, in order to avoid any optimism, Brazilian democracy may not have been able to move in the same direction and, in many respects, came to those conditions prior to 1964, apparently victim of a dependence on the trajectory (path dependence). To cite only some of these ills, extending the period of analysis, already encompassing recent times: the fragmentary political structure, inherited from CMR/64, did not receive improvements and, on the contrary, expanded this dispersion, leading the system to frequent crises of hegemony, two resulting in presidential impeachments; repeated evidence of widespread corruption in the political tissue; poor institutionalization and poor organization of state security systems that result in instabilities in this sector and require frequent military intervention under constitutional aegis; persistent institutional failure of the governing bodies in the federation units; among others.

These features, aggravated by the long-standing authoritarianism, seemingly, bequeathed a fragile political system, without the military interventionist crutch outside the constitutionality to support itself, implying that it is not because the presence of civilian counterparts that military power has manifested itself, even though constitutionally, but due to their institutional absences and bankruptcies. In this context of imbalances, only a very well structured hierarchy, backed by solid discipline, could provide the necessary cohesion so that the military authority, in times of crises and conflicts threatening social amalgamation, self-imposes limitations that prevent the return of the country to the primitive stage of the blows, until the constituted powers re-establish the necessary stability and harmony.

Usually accustomed to calculating risks, the military rulers tried to transfer to the civilian leadership a reliable, apolitical, constitutionalist and legalistic military structure, functionally, albeit not politically, autonomous, to act only at the most undesirable moment of rupture, which, despite the misfortunes, after more than thirty years of democratic restoration, still did not present itself. Therefore, the new sources

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11 To cite just one example of this malaise of society, envisioned this time outside the period of analysis that motivated this work. Take the constitutional remedy of the removal of the President of the Republic through impeachment: there were fourteen propositions against Fernando Henrique Cardoso; thirty-four against Luís Inácio Lula da Silva; and ten against Dilma Rousseff, only in the first term (NOBLAT, 2015).
of tension for civil-military relations, which could affect the complex balance between the controls and autonomy that should govern them, come from bankruptcies of the Civil Power. Some have been listed above, but they are numerous and are widespread throughout the state, with the notable exception of the jurisdictional subsystem, and continue to increase, under new influxes.

Until such impacts can be analysed in a future study, some of these results, observed in works dealing with the subject in periods later than was the object of this study, would, now, be re-studied in the light of this modest and, hopefully, useful contribution.
References


Pinto, José Cimar Rodrigues. (2019). O fio da espada: as Forças Armadas e a política no...


