The Strategic Planning of the National Power: A Vision from the National Defense

Ronaldo G. Carmona*

Abstract

The key elements of national power are a recurring theme in the debate on international relations, appearing in classical writers such as Morgenthau and Kenneth Walt. In Brazil, the theme of the elements of National Power was formulated mainly within the scope of the Brazilian War College (ESG). The following text seeks, firstly, to introduce the reader into the planning system structured by the Brazilian State as of the 1930 Revolution. Next, he specifically addresses the geopolitical contribution to this debate for a third and last part, to discuss the evolution of Brazilian Defense policies and strategies, relating them to the debate on national construction and the national development project. In this last part, the article is aimed at identifying and discussing the main vectors that show changes in the Brazilian national strategy observed from the key points of the main official documents. It is, therefore, a work that seeks to discuss, essentially, the contribution of the Brazilian Armed Forces to the national planning system, demonstrating how this participation has been decisive in the construction of the Nation.

Keywords: Armed Forces; Brazilian Defense Policies; Brazilian national strategy

*Ronaldo G. Carmona is a PhD from the University of São Paulo (USP) and Professor of Geopolitics at the Brazilian War College (ESG) where he currently coordinates two research groups: Geopolitics and Studies of War. (carmona@esg.br)
“O Exército é um órgão essencialmente político; e a ele interessa, fundamentalmente, sob todos os aspectos, a política verdadeiramente nacional, de que emanam, até certo ponto, a doutrina e o potencial de guerra. A política geral, a política econômica, a política industrial e agrícola, o sistema de comunicações, a política internacional, todos os ramos da atividade, da produção e da existência coletiva, inclusive a instrução e a educação do povo, o regime político-social – tudo, enfim afeta a política militar de um país”¹

(General Goés Monteiro, A Revolução de 30 e a finalidade política do Exército (Esboço histórico). Adersen Editores: Rio de Janeiro, s.d., p.133)

Introduction

The epigraph that opens this text is a classic synthesis of Brazilian strategic thinking. In a nutshell, it demonstrates how, in a country with the characteristics of Brazil, the Armed Forces and especially the Brazilian Army play a fundamental role on planning the National Power.

A key issue in the system of national planning is the search for greater autonomy and greater self-sufficiency in resources of various natures, which will characterize elements of the nation's power. This quest for greater national independence is accomplished through planning in view of the aggregation of elements of National Power.

This article, in addition to this short introduction, is composed of three parts. The first part will give a brief historical context related to key moments in planning the increase of the national potential. A second part will refer specifically to the military contribution to this historical process of national planning. Finally, a brief review of Brazilian Defense policies.

Key moments of planning the consolidation of the national potential: the Brazilian system in the post-1930

We can say that the system of planning the national development took an organic form in the Brazilian State, especially since the 1930 Revolution. We must remember that it a process of reorganization of the Armed Forces preceded 1930, in which, in collaboration with modern methods of military organization at the time (1920s), as well as in the so-called French military mission, there was a jump in planning the use and organization of the Forces.

From 1930 onwards, relevant areas were structured in the Brazilian State focused on development planning. In the challenge of facing the serious crisis of 1929, the CFCEX (Federal

¹ Army is, essentially, a political body; and it is of fundamental interest to him in all respects the truly national policy from which the doctrine and the potential of war emanate to some degree. General policy, economic policy, industrial and agricultural policy, the communications system, international politics, all branches of activity, production and collective existence, including education and education of the people, the political-social regime - everything, ultimately affects the military policy of a country.
Council of Foreign Trade) is organized at the beginning of the revolutionary government, which centralizes and organizes international exchanges in accordance with the national interest, in the form of a plan of action for the defense of the national economy.

It is when the Brazilian State, in a memorable event, anticipating the theses of John M. Keynes, structures a successful "Keynesian" policy before Keynes, of countercyclical action that can be considered, by its originality, an original achievement in economic history. Celso Furtado, in his classic Brazilian Economic Formation (1958), identified and valued this novelty in politics as to surplus coffee. In counter-cyclical action, the Brazilian state centralized the regulation of the price of coffee and controlled the exchange rate as a way of rationing foreign exchange and protecting the insipid national industry.

Subjected to the CFCEX, there were Councils, such as Control and Supply, National Defense and Economic Mobilization, which were of paramount importance especially in the context of the Second World War.

At the end of the Second War, two other organs emerged: the National Council of Industrial and Commercial Policy (CNPIIC) - where the “Simonsen - Gudin controversy” was developed, on Brazilian industrialization – and within the scope of the National Security Council, the Economic Planning Commission (CPE).

Another relevant initiative of the Brazilian State, in the midst of the 1930 Revolution, was the creation of the DASP (Administrative Department of the Public Service) that professionalized the federal administration, enabling progress in fulfilling its mission regarding national development planning.

In the 1950s a new wave of institutions would be created giving new capacities for planning the development of the Brazilian State. Most notable was the creation of the BNDE (National Bank for Economic Development) in 1952, during the second government of President Getúlio Vargas. Under Vargas presidency, Eletrobrás and Banco do Nordeste were also created, among other planning mechanisms. These initiatives were created under Getúlio Vargas' Economic Advisor, composed by distinguished Brazilians such as Inácio Rangel and Romulo de Almeida, among others. It is also imperative to register the creation of the CNEN (National Commission for Nuclear Energy), by Almirante Álvaro Alberto and the structuring of the ITA (Technological Institute of Aeronautics), by Brigadier Casemiro Montenegro - two long strategic feats term.

Before, the DASP technicians gave rise to an important plan, called SALTE - for Health, Food, Transport and Energy - under Dutra’s government. The government of Juscelino Kubistchek (1956-1960) was noted for its "Program of Goals", which sought to address bottlenecks in the economy, especially related to infrastructure and energy and basic industry - although nowadays it is mostly remembered by the large-scale introduction of the multinational automobile industry in Brazil and the construction of Brasília².

---

² JK’s Goals Plan is analyzed by Carlos Lessa’s classic work, 15 years of economic policy. São Paulo, Brasiliense, 1982.
Following this, Brazil witnessed the formulation of the Triennial Plan by Celso Furtado during the presidency of João Goulart - hampered by an inflationary outbreak and a political crisis. With the military regime, the Government Economic Action Plan (PAEG) was formulated under the presidency of Castelo Branco, followed by the National Development Plans, whose first edition was under the Medici government and the most notable, its second edition, already under Geisel’s presidency, with the celebrated II PND.

We can say that this set of plans related to the expansion of national capacity crowned the so-called “national-developmentism” period between 1930 and 1980. It was a period marked by the centrality of an “development ideology”, which united the country and allowed fundamental transformations for the Nation and nationality.

The 1980s and 1990s mark a period of crisis and disorientation of the national project. In the midst of the transition from the military period to democracy, to the inflationary outbreak and the adoption of liberal measures in the area of economy and foreign trade, the country limits its planning and lives a “short termism” period of government activity. The exceptions are multiannual plans, a legal requirement, which, however, does not have the strength and consistency of planning carried out in the national-developmental period.

From the end of the 1990s, still under the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the constitution of longer-term planning was outlined. It was the case of the "Brazil 2020" project, elaborated in 1998 from SAE (Secretariat for Strategic Affairs) when commanded by the ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, trying to make a reflection and prospection about the future of Brazil.

Under Lula´s government, a new exercise of long-term reflection appears with the Brazil project in Three Times (projeto Brasil em Três Tempos), which works with the structuring of goals with a temporal horizon of 2007 (end of that presidential term), 2015 (when Brazil should have fulfilled the millennium goals proposed by the United Nations) and 2022 (on the occasion of the bicentennial of national independence). This plan is coordinated by the then minister Luís Gushiken with the support of Cel. Osvaldo Oliva, which brings the accumulation of military planning methodology to the formulation of goals.

At the end of the second term of Lula’s presidency, the Brazil 2022 project has been structured. Coordinated by SAE, by ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, the aim was to discuss and prospect scenarios for the World, South America and Brazil in 2022, a set of Bicentennial Goals to be pursued by the country.

Between 2003 and 2014, a set of sectoral plans remarked the return of planning as a Brazilian State performance concept. Especially in the area of Science, Technology and Innovation and in the area of Defense - to be explored in more detail below - stand out. During this period an industrial policy has also been planned. But the main highlight, in order to focus directly on the country’s development planning regarding infrastructure, should be given to the Growth

---

Acceleration Plan (PAC), an extensive portfolio of works in areas such as transportation, energy, housing and sanitation, which the Central Administration has monitored and prioritized its funding between 2007 and 2014.

We can say that the planning system of the Brazilian State structured after 1930 had the purpose of organize itself to face the main problems aiming the densification of the National Power searching for greater autonomy of the country in the international system. Truncated at various times, as we have said above, can be analyzed as a perennial, long-term logic in the Brazilian trajectory.

According to SPEKTOR (2014) fifty years ago, in this area of the search for national autonomy, there is a basic project, in the form of a diffuse consensus, that configure Brazilian behavior in international relations. This is what we are calling development ideology, in order to create better conditions for the development of national capitalism—which means, elements of National Power - that will allow the "elusive space" of the national elites to increase.

This autonomist project would express its own national identity, in the form of beliefs and values that would constitute the Brazilian civilization itself. It also derives from the geography, size of the economy, the conditions of National Power that makes it "the country-type of the category of the countries insatiable" according to the Brazilian chancellor of Ernesto Geisel, Azeredo da Silveira (p.23).

The autonomist project is read in the international system, that is to say, by other powers, with great attention, because by its characteristics of great country, possible consolidation of elements of National Power will have repercussions on the balance of power. Thus:

As a rule, third countries interpret it as a more deeply revisionist program than its enunciation suggests. With increasing intensity in recent years, arguments about the supposed Brazilian ambition to undermine the rules of the game (such as rising spoilers in Radall Schweller’s expression) or to subvert them (as irresponsible stakeholder, in the expression of Stewart Patrick). This helps to explain why "the United States has been reluctant to anoint Brazil's rise (SPEKTOR, 2014, p.19-20).

Geopolitical and military contribution to the historical process of national planning

We observe a fundamental contemporary contribution, however current in the Brazilian strategic planning system present in the formulations of General Golbery do Couto e Silva. Let us take the so-called Annex 1 of his classic work, Geopolitics of Brazil (1967), entitled "Formulation of a national strategic concept (methodological essay)". Golbery bases the question in this way (1967, p.251):

The National Strategic Concept - C.E.N. - is the fundamental guideline that, in a given period, should guide the entire strategy of the Nation, with a view to achieving or safeguarding the National Objectives despite the antagonisms that appears or may arise, whether in the international field or even within the country. However, in a broad sense,
the Strategy of a Nation is confused, as we have seen, with the National Security Policy itself, which is responsible for:

- on the one hand, by the preparation in due time, and the appropriateness of the integral instrument of the strategic action - the National Power - through the elevation or strengthening of the Nation's Potential and its timely transformation in Effective Power;

- on the other hand, by designing and conducting, in times of peace and during war, the set of strategic actions aiming, both internally and internationally, to overcome or neutralize antagonisms that manifest against the achievement or safeguard of those National Objectives.

As we can see, the above propositions are highly up-to-date with the contemporary systematics of geopolitical and strategic precepts regarding National Power. The idea of National Strategic Concept, in the above view, is much more than a Force planning, as far as the doctrine and use of military power is concerned. By its definition it gives rise to a set of attributions that are much more affected by the concept of Great Strategy, in the sense of a breadth and dimension.

Essentially, it is related to what has been termed - sometimes in the academy, critically - as a National Security Doctrine. The origins of this, however, are much more remote. General Golbery's contribution is to improve it conceptually and bring it into the present - in this case, in the initial period of military governments.

Rigorously, as we said above, the basis of vision relates to the mission of the Armed Forces in a country with the characteristics of Brazil can be observed in pre-1930 formulations - which, strictly speaking, were the basis of ideas of the long period begun in 1930. As we have seen, it dates from 1931, the vision set forth by General Goés Monteiro on the Political Purpose of the Army, which founded and gave shape to the Doctrine of National Security.

With a totalizing vision, regarding the challenges of the national construction, a perennial vision, underlying until our days, was structured of the Defense policy as part of an overall strategy - or great strategy - for the country. From this vision of the mission of the Forces, it follows the explanation of the DSN for practicing the policy of the Army and not the policy of the Army. This is the turning point, especially in the second decade of the twentieth century, in the sense of a greater professionalization of an Army that until then had been excessive bacharelism - inherited from the positivist tradition - and with low conceptual and operational assimilation of the most modern military sciences.

It is exaggerated and one-sided the current view in many sectors of the academy that the Brazilian War College (ESG) would have emerged as a mainstay of US influence under the Brazilian Armed Forces in post-World War II. In the words of General Meira Mattos, a celebrated Brazilian geopolitical:

In 1949, with the creation of the Brazilian war College, Brazilian political thought began to be structured on a realistic and scientific basis. ESG is responsible for an essentially Brazilian political doctrine, based on the dynamics of the application of national power.
Based on the relationship of mutual causality between Security and Development, the doctrine defended by ESG for more than a quarter of a century is essentially based on the survey of the permanent national objectives and current national objectives, and the formulation of a policy for achieving: (1975, p.60).

Brazilian political and strategic thinking "at all times the relationship coexisted with coldness and detachment, never having strict coordination between foreign policies," according to Spektor. The author identifies "a Brazilian position of criticism of liberal internationalism (which) remained untouched during the liberal turn of the Brazilian political system with the end of the military regime." Even the presidents more identified with a liberalizing agenda (Collor and Fernando Henrique and, more recently, Michel Temer), were able to "keep some degree of detachment" (2014, p.25-26) - the final stance of Fernando Henrique's government in Québec's Summit, to say that the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) was an option - not a destination – is an indicative of this. An example of the use of autonomy in the international system is given by Oliveiros Ferreira, for whom,

[...] in the past, there has always been in the circle of those who really decide, the concern to make Brazil in the tortuous paths of nuclear research and missile technology in order to qualitatively change Brazil's position in the concert of nations. The condition for the realization of this policy was that the country should not be bound by any international treaty limiting its capacity for research in those fields considered "sensitive" by the two superpowers of the time - the United States and the Soviet Union (2001, p.21).

**Brief review of the course of contemporary Brazilian strategic thinking: the defense policies**

As we have seen previously, the Brazilian development planning system is rooted in the military planning system. The long developmental cycle was the successful experience of structural transformation of the Brazilian economy and of the consolidation of the national power that proved the correctness of this contribution.

The structuring of the Brazilian War College (ESG) in 1949 is a milestone in this planning of the aggregation of national potential. It is in this space that since its inception concepts such as the National Power have been endogenized and long-term planning systematics and methodologies established. It is necessary, as an introduction to the question, to observe that historically, given the characteristics of Brazil, recent territorial and ethnic formation, and insufficient - yet still today - geoeconomic integration, the Armed Forces have always faced a **dual mission**, one of endogenous nature another exogenous.

Its main function is to maintain the inviolability and territorial integrity and safeguard the country's political and economic power, in view of other actors in the international system. For the Armed Forces, there is a mission of an endogenous nature: to help in the national construction, the integration of the territory and the preservation and promotion of the national values.
This double mission has not always, historically, noted its optimum point. For a long time, especially between the end of the Second World War and the 1970s, our three Forces suffered the injunctions derived from the cleavage of the Cold War. The uncritical linkage - although not absolute, as we will see below - to the hemispheric ideological dynamics, limited the autonomous role of the Armed Forces in the establishment of a Brazilian doctrine.

First, because they are autonomous forces, forming structures without an operational dialogue, each one taking care of its part in a division of labor. As Marques observes, we had "an occupation army, a navy focused on antisubmarine warfare and an Aeronautics whose main concern was to manage the industrial complex of the air sector" (2001: 52).

The period between the 1970s and the end of the Cold War would bring geopolitical redefinitions to the Forces with deep operational consequences and gains in strategic autonomy. These were movements that would allow the qualitative leap forward in contemporary Brazilian strategic thinking.

In the case of the Navy, this process of reviewing its strategic role began with a reassessment of the alliance that began with the coming of the 1922 American Naval Mission, and more especially with the role it played in the context of the Cold War, as said, to concentrate on the Soviet submarine presence on its Atlantic coast. The signature of the Nuclear Agreement with Germany (June 1975), can be considered the turning point for greater autonomy, aiming at the long-term objective - which, in this 2017, we are just a few steps from completing - of obtaining a Nuclear propellant submarine in which we had the ability to design it and build it.

It can be said that the first great Brazilian experience in the search for autonomy in the projection and production of military equipment can be found under the administration of President Ernesto Geisel, when the Brazil-United States military agreement (1977) ruptures and the strengthening, of at least three companies that would form the pillars of Brazil's defense industrial base: Embraer - concealed in the Aeronautical Technological Institute (ITA) - Engesa, maker of armored vehicles and tanks, and Avibras, focused on artillery and air defense systems, rockets and missiles. Also, in this period, in a matter of direct interest to the Navy, is the 1979 Navy Nuclear Program (PNM), whose main objective is to dominate the entire nuclear fuel cycle in order to produce a nuclear reactor. Submarine. The PNM is a direct result of the US

---

4 An expressive strategic fact, fruit of the understanding that this Agreement, of 1952, that embodies the program of military assistance, no longer served the needs of the Forces. Since the Second World War, the United States has strongly influenced the Brazilian Armed Forces, both geopolitical, world-view and materialistic, becoming the major supplier of military equipment. In terms of ideas, strategic thinking incorporates the reading of the "defense of Western civilization" and the identification of the communist enemy - both on the external plane and on the internal plane (internal enemy) - as an object to be fought against. They symbolize this worldview, basic aspects of the geopolitical elaboration of General Golbery and the very foundation of the Brazilian War College (ESG). On the material plane, as the recent document of the Brazilian Army admits, "we began to adopt military thinking with relative autonomy only from the 1980s, when we adopted our own concepts and promoted the strengthening of the national defense industry" - see " The process of transformation of the Army, "3rd edition, available at www.exercito.gov.br.
technological blockade of the sale of ultracentrifugation technology provided for in the nuclear agreement signed with Germany in 1975.

In the specific case of the Brazilian Navy, the discontent with US material subordination to US equipment had already been in the 1960s, mainly "because of the US resistance to provide any type of weaponry to the navies of the hemisphere, to extrapolate the missions planned for these naval forces in the cold war ", that is, tasks of antisubmarine protection of maritime traffic, according to Admiral Armando Amorim Ferreira Vidigal5.

The Brazilian Army also carried out a major update of its strategic thinking following the denunciation of the military agreement with the United States in 1977. In Martins Filho's view, "although the Army has not placed the quest for greater autonomy at the center of its strategic perspectives in the United States, the intention to build power inevitably brought to the table the need to develop Brazil's strategic capacity and reduce its vulnerabilities "(p.85). Thus, the hypothesis of Martins Daughter is that the quest for autonomy was due more to the quest for greater autonomy in military technology. Anyone who observes the development of Engesa and Avibrás from then on will give reason to the author.

A fundamental aspect for the updating of strategic thinking was the Army's perception, after the Malvinas War (1982), of the "incapacity of the Brazilian Armed Forces for a conventional medium-intensity war" (Cavagnari Filho apud Martins Filho, 2006, p. 88). That is, the years of close material and doctrinal ties with the US Armed Forces had left significant strategic vulnerability to the Force's primary mission: the defense of the inviolability and integrity of the nation.

In addition, the Falkland Islands war was once again illusory about the hemispheric umbrella - which reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine, which took place in the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), according to which there would be hemispheric solidarity in the case of aggression of an extra regional power. Designed for a geopolitics of the containment of communism, however, it did not resist the aggression of the Anglo-Saxon European power to Argentina - a country, incidentally, with which during the Cold War, Washington's international cooperation "was much more intense. ..) than with the supposed ally Brazil "(SPEKTOR, 2014, P.26).

A final determining factor for a strategic repositioning of the Army in a sense of greater autonomy were the tendencies established in the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the proclamation of the end of history with the establishment of the liberal international order under the US unipolar hegemony. In particular, the relativization of national and territorial sovereignty, coupled with the unmistakable sign of a new race for natural resources, has led to the displacement of the geostrategic focus of the Army of La Plata River region to the Brazilian Amazon.

---

With this, doctrinal background change was established in the Land Force. Gradually, the *hypothesis of a war* centered on a friction with Argentina - which required the constitution of powerful cavalry, artillery and infantry forces along the southern border, especially in Rio Grande do Sul, was abandoned. War or employment predominantly occurred in the Amazonian environment, in which Brazil would face an extra-regional power (or coalition of powers) that threatened its sovereignty over Hileia.

Observing the experience of asymmetric warfare in recent military history, both in Brazil - especially in the long struggle against the Araguaia Guerrilla (1973-1975) - and externally - with the study of the principles of Chinese (Mao) and Vietcong revolutionary warfare - the formulation of a doctrine of resistance demonstrated in several episodes of our history and to which we will return later.

The Brazilian Air Force was the force that perhaps most maintained a line of relative continuity in strategic thinking. The latest founded (1944) and smaller force dedicated its efforts to attend and integrate the country-continent by air, however, it has always been a technological force, which from early on had to constitute capacity of some autonomy in view of the black boxes that have always been aerial artifacts. Brigadier Casemiro Montenegro's effort to set up the Aeronautical Technological Institute, the subsequent emergence of EMBRAER and the imperative need for the development of the Brazilian Space Program - in order to dominate the immense national territory - have always been powerful incentives to maintain some autonomous technological, even in times of greater strategic polarization in Brazil by the geopolitics of the Cold War.

The rupture of the military agreement with the United States in 1977 initiated a new phase in Brazilian strategic thinking that would only be completed, in our opinion, with the publication of the first public document on the subject: the National Defense Policy (PDN), 1996, still in the first term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

The rupture of 1977 with the military agreement with the United States of 1952, but words of Admiral Mario César Flores, former minister of the Navy, "conditioned us doctrinally and materially for almost 30 years" (in ALMEIDA PINTO, 2004, p.33).

Let us now look at the National Defense document to identify traces of this evolution of strategic thinking that we seek to develop above. The first document we can call "national defense", according to our research, is classified as "top secret" issued by the Armed Forces Staff (EMFA) in March 1969, entitled "National Strategic Concept". Here we observe fully the complete assimilation, which conceptual or even literal, of the proposition of General Golbery do Couto e Silva formulated two years before in Geopolitics of Brazil. The document met a second edition in 1974, a text that we will use for the purpose of this comment.

The CEN is a direct product of the methodology and the conceptualization formulated within the scope of the Brazilian War College (ESG). It is divided into two parts. The first is a "synthesis of the political assessment juncture". The second is essentially about the *hypotheses of war*, that is, the possibilities of employment of the Armed Forces from the analysis of juncture.
However, the course of the evolution of Brazilian strategic thinking can be more noticeable with the edition of the National Defense Policy of 1996. This closes a cycle, opened in 1977 and that extended two decades in view of the environment of absolute uncertainty that characterized both the internal plan and the international situation. After all, it was the period, internally, of the transition between the military government and the 1988 Constitution, followed by a period of continuity of instability derived from the peculiar election, by the direct vote of a new President of the Republic, Fernando Collor de Mello - with a policy relatively hostile to national and strategic interests, followed by his impeachment and Itamar Franco’s interim presidency.

The Real Plan (1994) and the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s period was foreseen of greater stabilization. But the initial dazzle of the new Brazilian president with globalization and his explicitly liberal policy of the first period, prevented movements of greater national affirmation. The PDN (National Defense Policy) itself of 1996 can be considered, in this sense, a point outside the curve, because it appeared in a moment of weak strategic initiative of Brazil. We can say that its appearance was related to another priority of FHC’s period, object of strategic controversy then, that was the creation of the Ministry of Defense (MD), in 1999.

The PDN can be read as a movement to lessen the resistance to the creation of the MD - seen by many in the strategic thinking community as something tied to the weakening line of the Armed Forces in the wake of the policy of declining statehood and enthusiastic adherence to globalization. Nevertheless, the text of the PDN - 1996 raises important questions.

The first definition of the NPD refers to its scope, thus defined: "The National Defense Policy, focused on external threats, aims to set the objectives for the defense of the Nation, as well as guiding the preparation and the use of national training, at all levels and spheres of power, and with the involvement of the civilian and military sectors" (item 1.3).

Turning to "external threats" - which continued to exist, despite being written a few years after the liberal euphoria of 1989-1991, with the defeat and dissolution of the Soviet Union - and following the tradition of classical Brazilian military planning, confronted them, proposed that the task of defending the nation was not restricted to the military sphere strictly, but to "all levels and spheres of power."

Faced with a changing world, where paradigms were altered since the end of World War II, the text defined that "the end of the Cold War made obsolete the simplifying generalizations derived from ideological and military bipolarity, until then in force. Currently, despite the reduction of the risks of nuclear confrontation on a global scale, the relative strategic predictability has disappeared" (item 2.2).

In this definition, it was clear that one of the vertebral columns of the Brazilian geopolitics of the Cold War - the link to the anti-communist hemispheric umbrella scheme –became obsolete. Thus, it was recognized that there was a "phase of transition, establishing new political and economic rules of coexistence among nations, characterized by the absence of clear paradigms" (item 2.4). In this context, Brazil was called upon to reinforce its autochthonous strategic thinking.
The 1996 PDN also defines the concept definition that would later be called the strategic environment. The text states that "for Brazil, a country of different internal regions and with a diversified profile, at the same time Amazon, Atlantic, Platinum and Southern Cone, the conception of the regional space extrapolates the South American continental mass and also includes the Atlantic South" (item 2.7). Thus, by "extrapolating" the terrestrial continental mass and encompassing the South Atlantic, a movement begins, which would follow, of extending the geostrategic objectives of Brazil.

These definitions also take root in the geographical characteristics of the country, which left us a mixed or amphibious territory - as one of the first heralds of Brazilian geopolitics, Colonel Mario Travassos, said. In Brazil, the basic contradiction expressed among the classics of geopolitics - the disjunctive between Mahan's naval power and Mackinder's land power - is not present. On the contrary, our territory requires attention on both at the same time, to its two geographical aspects, to its "two Amazons": the green and the blue - the latter being denominated so by the central importance of the South Atlantic to the Brazilians.

To a certain extent, one could say, the realistic and geopolitical conception underlying the PDN contrasted with the orientation of the Fernando Henrique government, which in its first phase (1996 is the second year of the first term) was enthusiastic about globalization. But above all, the PDN seeks to initiate a new reading that allows the updating of strategic thinking without falling into the contemplative liberal traps of US unipolarity.

The next steps to update Brazilian strategic thinking would come with President Lula's government. From September 2003 until mid-2004, the Ministry of Defense held a series of eight rounds of debates in a military organization located in Itaipava (RJ), which would result in important subsidies for the new National Defense Policy, which results were published in four volumes entitled "Reflections on defense and security: a strategy for Brazil".

The 2005 NDP, in addition to reaffirming the 1996 text that addresses external threats, clarifies certain concepts, giving more clarity to strategic definitions, without, however, abandoning the traditional planning methodology in National Defense. Already in its introduction, it says that "it is composed of a political part, that contemplates the concepts, the international and national environments and the objectives of the defense. Another part of strategy encompasses the guidelines", maintaining the hierarchical relationship of strategic thinking - since Clausewitz at least - of the hierarchical subordination relationship between politics and strategy.

Then, in the introduction of the 2005 version, a key concept is presented which defines that, unlike the idyllic liberal vision, the country is faced with external threats. The text says;

After a long period without Brazil participating in conflicts that directly affect the national territory, the perception of the threats is fading for many Brazilians. However, **it is unwise to imagine that a country with the potential of Brazil does not have disputes or antagonisms when seeking to achieve its legitimate interests.** One of the purposes of the National Defense Policy is to make all segments of Brazilian society aware that the defense of the Nation is a duty of all Brazilians.
It has great relevance for the redefinition of our strategic thinking this idea, highlighted by us. Of a clearly realistic scope, it can be read by the key in which the country, when pursuing the development of its National Power, will be confronted with antagonisms.

This item should be complemented by a following, which states that "in this century, disputes over maritime areas, the aerospace domain, and increasingly scarce sources of fresh water and energy may intensify. Such issues may lead to interferences in internal affairs, configuring conflict tables" (item 2.1). Here, too, we take a step forward by naming exogenous interests that the country can confront, introducing the issue of strategic natural resources - fresh water and energy. Another item (1.3), notes that:

Gradually, the concept of security has been expanded, encompassing the political, military, economic, social, environmental and other fields. However, foreign defense remains the primary role of the Armed Forces in the interstate. Measures aiming at security are broad-spectrum, involving, in addition to external defense: civil defense; public security; economic, health, educational, environmental and other areas, many of which are not addressed through political-military instruments.

In other words, it refers to broadening the scope of issues that have a security dimension. There is a new step in the geographic definition of areas of national interest, with the emergence of the concept of strategic surrounding area. The text states that "the country envisions a strategic surrounding that goes beyond the mass of the subcontinent and included the projection along the South Atlantic border and the neighboring countries of Africa" (item 3.1). "Brazil attaches priority to the countries of South America and Africa, especially those in Southern Africa and Portuguese-speaking countries, seeking to deepen their ties with these countries" (item 4.9).

The introduction of this concept by Defense policy has great relevance. The delimitation presented here has clear traces of novelty. José Luís Fiori (2013, p. 32) proposes a new and revolutionary concept in Brazilian history: the concept of a 'strategic surrounding' of the country, the region where the country wants to radiate - preferably - its influence and its diplomatic, economic and military leadership ... ".

Finally, in this brief presentation of the 2005 PDN, it is worth noting that "The reactive aspect of defense, in case of aggression against the country, will employ all national power, with emphasis on military expression, exercising the right of legitimate defense in the UN Charter (item 6.3). " Here is a classic concept regarding the use of the set of instruments of the National Power in view of the objectives of Defense.

Next, it is important to highlight a new moment that is the appearance of a second document, which unfolds the policy, called the National Defense Strategy (END), in the year 2008. It is, in our view, from the conceptual point of view, a true turning point for the Brazilian Great Strategy.

First of all, because of its context. The year 2007, when a working group for the preparation of a document was created, Lula was just re-elected. It was also the year in which, in the national imaginary, the country moves to the condition of power in the international
system. The "haughty and active" foreign policy of the chancellor Celso Amorim and the international prestige of President Lula give the Brazilians the feeling that national greatness is finally taking place.

In this same 2007, President Lula establishes the decision to revitalize the project of the nuclear submarine and the Nuclear Program of the Navy. On July 10, 2007, President Lula visits the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó (SP), the base of the Navy's Nuclear Program. Convinced of the highly strategic importance for Brazil, Lula decided to release resources that reinvigorate the program - which was in a vegetative state practically from the literal shovel that President Collor had played in Serra do Cachimbo, symbolizing the burial of our program in 1991.

Shortly afterwards, in November 2007, Petrobras informed the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) and the National Energy Policy Council (CNPE) that its geological studies indicated the existence of great oil potential in the Continental Shelf in an area of 149 thousand km², which extends from the coast of Espírito Santo to Santa Catarina. It was the appearance of the Pre-Salt. With it, the decision to reinvigorate the program to obtain the nuclear submarine becomes clearer due to the need to protect Brazil's oil reserves.

In January 2008, the Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, on a visit to France, goes to the naval base of Toulon. In this occasion, he develops important talks regarding a possible cooperation with this country. As a result of the reinvigoration of PNM, decided in 2007, in September 2008, the Navy activates Cogesen (General Coordination of the Submarine Development Program with Nuclear Propulsion), to manage the design and construction of the shipyard, the base and the submarine.

Finally, in December, at the same time as the new National Defense Strategy (END) is being enacted - a strategic inflection point in the Brazilian geopolitical vision - the visit of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, with which important agreements are signed, including the military field This begins the negotiations that would result, nine months later, in the signing of PROSUB, in September 2009.

This retrieval of the context of the strategic moves during 2007-2008 is important to corroborate the idea of inflection point. The idea of the nuclear-powered submarine to protect what in the national imaginary would be our winning ticket to a future of greatness - the pre-salt - symbolized a definite shift in strategic thinking, leaving behind the obsolete part of national geopolitics - the illusion of hemispheric protection of the cold war - and it values the very current part of this thinking - the aggregation of National Power.

The ideas of PDN 2005 and END 2008 would be reaffirmed in their 2012 update, already under the leadership of Celso Amorim at the head of the Ministry of Defense, in which a third document would be added: the White Paper on National Defense, which along with now National Defense Policy and the National Defense Strategy, would become a triad of strategic documents for the country.

In that period of little more than a decade - that goes from the debates in the mountains of Itaipava in 2003 to the end of the administration of the minister Aldo Rebelo, in May of 2015
we can say, the strengthened capacity of national defense and the conceptual update of the thought have given important leaps. Let us briefly present some of the achievements in the period.

First, this strategic update can be summed up in the words of then Minister Celso Amorim for whom Brazil has a Defense strategy that foresees "cooperation inside, deterrence out", that is, in our geographical surrounding a cooperation with its neighbors.

Regarding the outside space, our strategic surrounding, Brazil must maintain its deterrence capacity, in order to discourage eventual attempts to constrain national sovereignty, especially in view of increasing pressure on countries with natural resources and strategic assets, as it is the case in Brazil, such as drinking water, minerals, agricultural land and food production capacity, biodiversity and energy - for example, Brazil may, in a few years, go from the 13th to the 4th position in terms of production.

The National Defense Strategy, at the same time, defined the restructuring and re-equipping of the Armed Forces, aiming to strengthen our Defense capacity. To this finality, it proposes measures aimed at developing a strong national technological and industrial defense base. Both measures had important course in the period in screen. Thus, great strategic projects of the Armed Forces have begun.

Since the National Defense Strategy, Brazil has started to invest heavily in large strategic projects of the Armed Forces, accumulating potential and capacity to make a quality leap in the Brazilian deterrent capacity, while mobilizing the national productive and technological base. Among other strategic projects initiated, we can mention:

1. the construction of the Nuclear Submarine which will represent a significant strategic advance in the defense capacity of Brazilian territorial waters, in a context in which its wealth, especially the pre-salt, will become increasingly important in the Brazilian economy and in the global energy equation. The first conventional Submarine designed and built by Brazilians will be delivered to the Navy between 2018 and 2019. By obtaining that nuclear propulsion, Brazil will thus be the first country to have this capability beyond the UN Security Council countries - only India is also close to reaching this capacity. Around the bicentennial of independence, in 2022, we will have the Submarine nuclear propulsion defending our waters.

2. the signing of the contract for the joint acquisition and development with the Swedes of the new fighter plane of the Brazilian Air Force, Gripen NG. With this, we will prepare conditions for the next decade to develop a national 5th generation fighter. Like the Submarine, also in the case of the fighter jet, an important industrial mobilization will be sought for the nationalization of this equipment.

3. the development of the Brazilian Air Force project of the large military aircraft KC-390, by Embraer, the largest aircraft ever produced by this company, which will allow technological leap in the Brazilian capacity of aircraft construction. The first prototype of the plane flew in late 2014.
4. Program for the acquisition of large military helicopters (EC-725) called HX-BR, with potential for the Ministry of Defense to gather training for Brazil to design and build a national helicopter.

5. Development and construction of the Geostationary Defense and Strategic Communications Satellite (SGDC), launched in 2017, which allowed the country to reestablish complete autonomy in military communications.

6. The first deliveries of more than two thousand units of the new Brazilian armored vehicle Guarani, designed by the Brazilian Army. In this case, there is the great challenge of increasing its nationalization index, especially in its most sensitive parts.

7. The beginning of the structuring, on the border of Mato Grosso do Sul, of the SISFRON (Integrated Border Monitoring System) - a great monitoring and presence system across the Brazilian terrestrial frontier - that will make a great contribution to prevent the arrival of drugs to large Brazilian urban centers, in an important contribution of the National Defense to the public safety of Brazilians. The second phase of Sisfron is already under preparation and will be developed in Paraná.

8. National development by Avibras - a company that is the "gold jewel" of our defense industrial base - the new Astros 2020 rocket launcher system, with national cruise missiles (TM300) with a capacity to reach 300 kilometers range. Along with the acquisition of modern Russian anti-aircraft batteries Pantsir S-1 - with a requirement of transfer of technology to the national industry - Brazil will give important leap in its antiaircraft deterrent capacity.

9. In addition, there are expressive initial steps in the reorganization of an Industrial and Technological Defense Base. The first administration of President Dilma, under the leadership of Celso Amorim, was marked by the format of a legal and institutional framework aimed at supporting the National Defense Industry. If the National Defense Strategy was a turning point in the Brazilian position regarding National Defense, the approval of Law 12,598 in 2012 was the materialization of the orientation aimed at raising a robust defense industrial base to be developed and implemented. In this, it was defined:

10. Special rules for procurement, contracting and development of Defense products and systems, prioritizing Brazilian companies with national capital. This measure is especially important in the context of the initiation of several strategic projects, as we have seen above.

11. Establishment of the Strategic Defense Company (EED), defined by the Ministry of Defense, among those that develop technological and innovative products and processes in the country, which have their headquarters in Brazil, and at least 2/3 of the votes in the hands of Brazilians. These companies will have a set of support measures, from the participation as prime contractor in the strategic projects of the Armed Forces until granting specific financing in order to strengthen them. We currently have more than 50 EEDs in various segments of the Defense area.

An important highlight in the first Dilma government was the Inova Company Program, which provided for the provision of financing for Brazilian companies to invest in innovation and technology. Inova Aero Defesa, focused on four areas (Aerospace, Defense, Public Safety and...
Special Materials), approved 91 plans of 64 leading companies with initial potential of R$ 8.68 billion - almost 3 times more than the initial offer of R$ 2.9 billion available in the announcement.

Aldo Rebelo’s brief leadership at the helm of the Ministry of Defense - from October 2015 to May 2016 - already in the middle of the crisis that would culminate in the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff - had to face the four-year update of the strategic Defense documents⁶. In addition, it tried to face the problem of financing the strategic projects of Defense, amidst serious economic crisis already presented then. Aldo Rebelo would also make an important contribution to the conceptual framework of the role of the Armed Forces in presenting the concept of the dual mission of the Forces in a country with the characteristics of Brazil.

**Conclusion**

The present article sought to revisit the Brazilian experience of planning the increase of national potential, especially between the 1930s and the 21st century. It shows, as in the face of the recent project crisis and prospects that Brazil is experiencing, it is necessary to review this historical experience in view of its auspicious result: to make Brazil one of the largest industrial economies on planet.

In this sense, the revision of this trajectory is fundamental in view of the resumption of the Brazilian project in the next historical period, in view of the new and changing international reality.

⁶ As a member of the Ministry of Defense, as head of the Special Advisory for Planning (ASPLAN), responsible unit, together with the EMCFA (Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces) for updating the three strategic documents, we contributed to its revision; however, the final version was forwarded on 9/29/2017, when we were no longer in the MD.
References


Martins Filho, J. R. (s/d) “As Forças Armadas brasileiras no pós-guerra fria”, disponível em http://www.tensoesmundiais.net/index.php/tm


