Constitutional Economics and Public Choice

Authors

  • Carolina Leister Escola de Economia de São Paulo - Fundação Getúlio Vargas

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v1n1p116-127

Abstract

From the Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem indicating the instability of the majoritarian rules, the theoreticians of Constitutional Economics/Public Choice extend the consequences of this theorem pointing as the decisions politics under majority leading the public sector to become enlarged beyond the constitutional limits fixed for it. The solutions proposed for this expansion must be placed in the proper Constitution, limiting and defining the permissible alternatives to the decisions taken under majority.

Author Biography

  • Carolina Leister, Escola de Economia de São Paulo - Fundação Getúlio Vargas

    Escola de Economia de São Paulo

    Fundação Getúlio Vargas

    Área: Escolha Pública

Published

2010-06-06