

PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND COGNITION

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Abstract

In this paper I want to point toward a pragmatic treatment of exportation and *de re* beliefs, not in terms of Gricean maxims, but as cognitive abilities. To do that I will present a short introduction of the problem of propositional attitudes raised by Quine. Then I briefly explain Kaplan's approach to the reduction of *de re* beliefs in terms of *de dicto* beliefs. Finally, I discuss Sosa's contextual/pragmatic approach of the exportation and Kripke's criticism. My own view lies about halfway between Sosa and Kripke.

I

Philosophers often distinguish between two kinds of belief, namely, *de re* and *de dicto*. A *de dicto* belief is a belief that some proposition (a *dictum*) is true, a *de re* belief is a belief that a particular object (a *res*) has certain property. Thus the sentence,

(1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy,

is ambiguous, because it has two readings: one reading expresses a relation between Ralph and the proposition that there are spies, and the other reading expresses a relation between Ralph and some particular object that it is a spy.

Quine, in his famous paper "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" (1956), introduced a distinction very similar of verbs such as 'hunting', 'wishing', 'wanting', and 'believing': a notional sense and a relational sense. So we have:

(2) Ralph believes that there are spies (notional),

(3) There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy (relational).

While (2) expresses something "weaker" than (3), a triviality we may say, or as Quine puts, if Ralph is like most of us, he believes that someone or other is a spy, (3) should express an important information, that someone in particular is a spy.

Using extensional first-order logic Quine (1956), presented a general analysis of how to symbolize the aforementioned readings. The formulations are treated as permutations between the existential quantifier and the verb "believe", thus we have:

(4) Ralph believes that $(\exists x)$ (x is a spy) (which represents the notional or *de dicto*),
and

(5) $(\exists x)$ (Ralph believes that x is a spy) (relational or *de re*).

However, the formalization of the relational sense (5) requires quantifying into a propositional attitude context from outside, and this, according to Quine "is a dubious business" (1956, p. 185). To show that, Quine proposes his famous example about Ralph who saw a suspicious man in a brown hat and whose attitude suggests that he is a spy. Ralph also believes that a certain grey haired man he saw at the beach, who is a pillar of the community and who is called Bernard J. Ortcutt, is not a spy. Unbeknownst to Ralph is that the man in the brown hat and the man he saw at the beach are the same person.

Now, consider the man Bernard J. Ortcutt himself, without any characterization of his qualities (being the grey haired man seen at the beach or being the man in a brown

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hat), the crucial question advanced by Quine is: does Ralph believe that Ortcutt is a spy?

In other words, consider the following sentence,

(6) Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy.

Is (6) true or false? Well, it will be true if and only if, using Church's ' λ '-abstraction operator, property expressed by:

(7) (λx) [Ralph believes that x is a spy]

is satisfied by Ortcutt himself. (Salmon 1998)

At first sight, it seems that is not possible to evaluate (6) or (7) just from the assignment of Ortcutt as a value of the variable x , because whether Ralph believes or not of Ortcutt that he is a spy depends crucially of how Ralph thinks about Ortcutt. If Ralph thinks about him under the guise of "the man in the brown hat" the answer seems yes. But if Ralph is conceiving him like "the man seen at the beach" the natural answer seems to be no. This force us to accept the following conjunction:

(8) Ralph believes that "..." and Ralph sincerely denies "..."

where the two blanks are filled by the same sentence, which is, Quine says (although without giving any reason for this), unacceptable.

Therefore the consequence seems to be that quantification into a nonextensional context like "Ralph believes that ..." does not make sense because it implies a contradiction like the one we have in 8. To understand a quantified sentence we should be able to say about some open sentence " x is a spy" if it is true or false of certain things, regardless their properties. So the position of the variable should be open to substitution. However this does not happen in 7. Belief contexts such "Ralph believes that ..." are what Quine calls 'opaque' contexts, that is, they are not open to free substitution of co-referential singular terms. Quine concludes from it that we should abandon the quantification within propositional attitudes.

Nonetheless, at the same time, and here is the problem, we cannot give up the locution "There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy", "we are scarcely prepared to sacrifice the relational construction" (Quine, 1956, p. 179). Quine's strategy to deal with this dilemma (on the one hand we cannot quantify into nonextensional contexts and on the other hand we cannot give up the intuition that there is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy) is to regiment notional and relational beliefs distinguishing them in an essential way. Quine treats propositional attitudes like a relation between a believer and a certain intension². In this way both notional and relational beliefs are first conceived like intensions, where notional beliefs represent intentions of degree 0 or propositions, and relational beliefs intensions of degree 1, or properties. Intensions or properties (Φ) of degree n such that ($n \geq 1$) can be represented by $\lambda x (\Phi x)$ ³. Quine rewrites (4) and (5) in the following manner:

² Quine abhorred intensions. In his very recognized quotes he says "Intensions are creatures of darkness, and I shall rejoice with the reader when they are exorcised" (1956, p. 180) But even so they are useful, and he completes "but first I want to make certain points with help of them" (*Ibid*, p. 180).

³ The original representation of the relational belief given by Quine was z (z is a spy) where Φ in our example represents 'is a spy'.



(9) $B_N(\text{Ralph}, (\exists y) (y \text{ is a spy}))$.

(10) $(\exists y) B_R(\text{Ralph}, y, \lambda x (x \text{ is a spy}))$.

This maneuver allows Quine to take the singular term from inside to outside of the ‘that’-clause, and express that ‘there is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy’ without quantifying into propositional attitudes. Both the *de dicto* sentence:

(11) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy,

and the problematic *de re* sentence:

(6) Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy,

can be translated into:

(12) $B_N(\text{Ralph}, \text{Ortcutt is a spy})$

(13) $B_R(\text{Ralph}, \text{Ortcutt}, \lambda x (x \text{ is a spy}))$.

Sentence (12) represents a dyadic relation, the relation between Ralph and the proposition that ‘Ortcutt is a spy’, and the sentence (13) represents a triadic relation between Ralph, Ortcutt and $\lambda x (x \text{ is a spy})$.

Quine’s distinction between relational/notional beliefs were very well set out in a unified analyses of these two kinds of belief. In the very sense of a proposition and a predicate notion are accounted for the extensional first order logic, wherein a predicate letter symbol P^0 which represents a sentence letter or a proposition, i.e., a predicate letter of zero-grade; and a predicate letter P^n ($n \geq 1$) which represents a property or a relation (when $n > 1$). Thus in a predicate letters sequence beginning with P^0 and followed by $P^1, P^2, P^3 \dots$ we can represent in an ordered way two or more different kinds of abstract objects like propositions, properties and relations. So Quine, in an analogy with extensional first order logic, could treat different kinds of intentional objects like thoughts and a number of intentions with his technical apparatus, where ‘that’-clauses are *n*-adic relations. I have spoken of the analogy between the multi-grade analysis of relational/notional beliefs and the first order predicate logic, but actually, Quine, possibly takes that idea from Russell’s (1910) ‘multiple relation theory of judgement’ where propositions work like *relata* in a judgements analysis.

The treatment given to those two kinds of belief was only the first step for Quine’s account of propositional attitudes. There are two more problems to be solved: first, intentional notions need to be eliminated; second, remains a requirement of a specific explanation of the logical relation between the two concepts of belief.

II

David Kaplan in his insightful paper “Quantifying In” (1968) dealt with the second problem in terms of a reduction between the two notions, or more specifically as a problem of the analysis of *de re* beliefs in terms of *de dicto* beliefs. But the first concern of Kaplan was to dismiss Quine’s thesis about the meaningless of the quantification into nonextensional (opaque) contexts. As well as Quine, the most influential doctrine which determined his philosophy was probably the Fregean view about intermediate or oblique

(*ungerade*) contexts. However Quine and Kaplan have followed different interpretations of that doctrine. Kaplan has pointed out that “Frege’s treatment of oblique contexts is often described as one according to which expressions in such contexts denote their ordinary sense (...). But this is a bad way of putting the matter” (Kaplan, 1968, p. 185). For Kaplan there is a misunderstanding between two separate conflicting principles in Frege’s theory: (a) expressions in oblique contexts don’t have their ordinary denotation (which, for Kaplan is true) and (b) singular terms in oblique contexts refer to their ordinary sense (which to him is false). Kaplan accepts the first principle and rejects the second. His view with respect to the second principle stems mainly from a misinterpretation of Frege’s understanding of quotation contexts. According to Kaplan, it is possible to show that “what is opaque for Quine is already fully referential for Frege.” (Kaplan, 1968, p. 187)

Now, let’s return to the reduction between relational beliefs and notional beliefs. Kaplan (1968) found a way of establishing exactly when Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy. That is, Kaplan has established necessary and sufficient conditions for when the inference from (6), which attributes a *de re* belief to Ralph, to (11), which attributes a *de dicto* belief to Ralph, is valid. The sentence (6) is analyzed as:

(14) $\exists \alpha [\Delta (\alpha, \text{Ortcutt}) \ \& \ \text{Ralph } \mathbf{B}_N \ulcorner \alpha \text{ is a spy } \urcorner]$,

where ‘ $\Delta (\alpha, \text{Ortcutt})$ ’ represents the denotation relation, so ‘ α ’ denotes Ortcutt.

Of course, it is not sufficiently restricted, since we can infer from:

(4) Ralph believes that $(\exists x) (x \text{ is a spy})$,

and from the assumption that no two spies have exactly the same height, that

(16) Ralph believes that the shortest spy is a spy,

and by exportation and existential generalization we may conclude that:

(17) $\exists x$ Ralph believes that $(x \text{ is a spy})$.

And it cannot be, because we cannot from the fact that ‘Ralph believes that there are spies’ to reach the conclusion that ‘there is somebody whom Ralph believe to be a spy’, if so, anyone at Ralph’s position should report it immediately to FBI.

So Kaplan’s next move was to restrict even more the requirement on the inference, which is called *exportation*. Exportation may be properly defined as the inference, via existential-generalization, from a notional (wide scope) formulation over a singular term within the ‘that’-clause, to a relational formulation *de re*, whereby the singular term is put outside of the context ‘believes that’, allowing substitution of co-designative singular terms. The inference from (4) to (17) is called unrestricted exportation⁴.

The restriction introduced by Kaplan to avoid inferences from 4 to 17 appeals to his notion of *representation*. The *de re* thoughts are characterized by being expressed by an expression α that represents an individual x in a special way. According to Kaplan α represents x to Ralph (symbolized: ‘ $R(\alpha, x, \text{Ralph})$ ’) if and only if (i) α denotes x , (ii) α is a name of x for Ralph, and (iii) α is (sufficiently) vivid.” (1968, p. 203) Actually α is not a term, but an individual concept like Salmon has pointed out: “Strictly speaking, on

⁴ Quine initially accepted this, but later considering some objections raised by Hintikka and later by Robert Sleight⁴, according to which the inference from (2) to (3) threatens to trivialize the difference between them, he dropped that idea. Take the famous example of the tallest spy: if someone believes that there are spies, and assumes that there are no two spies of the exactly same height, so, she should agree that ‘the tallest spy is a spy’, which means, by inference, that there is someone she believes to be a spy, something we, in our simplest epistemology, are not willing to accept. Or as Sosa has put “From the fact that S believes that the tallest spy is a spy it does not necessarily follow that there is anyone he believes to be a spy, even given a tallest spy” (1970, p. 887)



the “Quantifying In” analysis, the vivid name α is ultimately not a term but an individual concept” (2003, p. 36, fn. 10) Thus the final version is this:

(18) $(\exists \alpha) [R(\alpha, \text{Ortcutt}, \text{Ralph}) \ \& \ \text{Ralph} \ \mathbf{B_N} \ulcorner \alpha \text{ is a spy } \urcorner]$.

To say that Ralph has a *de re* (relational) belief about Ortcutt himself is the same claim that Ralph has an expression in his lexical repertory which designates Ortcutt to him; is a vivid name, that is, a clear concept/representation of Ortcutt; and denotes Ortcutt.

III

Ernest Sosa in “Propositional Attitudes de Dictu and de Re” (1970) argued that, according to Kaplan’s notion of representation, it is not possible to apprehend *de re* thoughts about any objects in the future. In order to solve that problem, Sosa proposes a slightly different principle from the one Kaplan proposed:

“S believes about x that it is F (believes x to be F) if and only if there are singular terms α and β such that S believes $\ulcorner \alpha \text{ is } F \urcorner$, where β (i) represents x for S, and (ii) takes the place of α in the sentence of S’s language that expresses his belief $\ulcorner \alpha \text{ is } F \urcorner$. (1970, p. 888)

The main ingredient of Kaplan’s notion of *name of*, no doubt, is the concept of causal chain. Similar to the relation between a picture and the object upon which the picture is about, there is that which Kaplan call “*genetic character*” of a name: “The genetic character of a picture [and so to a name] is determined by the causal chain of events leading to its production.” (1968, p. 197) This ingredient, accord to Sosa, is responsible for depriving us from apprehending such thoughts about objects in the future: “Suppose, accordingly, that term α “represents” thing x for subject S provided that α denotes x and is α “vivid” name in S’s repertoire. Under this conception of representation, account II presumably has no longer the consequence that we can have no beliefs about things entirely future.” (Sosa, 1970, p. 889)

Sosa’s own formulation, that avoids this inconvenient character, is the following:

III. S believes about x that it is F (believes x to be F) if and only if, there is a singular term α such that S believes $\ulcorner \alpha \text{ is } F \urcorner$ where α both denotes x and is a *distinguished term*⁵. (1970, p. 890)

But, what exactly is a distinguished term? Primarily it seems that being distinguished is Sosa’s criterion to export an expression, which corrects and permits our access to *de re* thoughts about future events involving the referent of the expression. Secondly, as well as a vivid term, a distinguished term is context relative, that is, what makes an expression to count as a distinguished one, “is a wholly pragmatic matter which can change radically from one occasion to the next” (Sosa, 1970, p. 890). Sosa explains this feature aiming that sometimes “what counts as a distinguished term is rather indefinite” (890), on the other hand, sometimes it “is much more definite” (891). Sosa supplies two examples to show the indefiniteness of a distinguished term and one example to show that sometimes what counts as a distinguished term is, instead, very definite.

⁵ My emphasis.



His first example involves a situation where a sergeant, after consulting his superiors says to the shortest man in his platoon: “Shorty, they want you to go first” (890), following the instructions of the higher authority. However the only thing expressed by the higher authority is that the shortest man go first. The sergeant has an interest/purpose, send someone to accomplish a mission, but not just any mission, actually a mission which requires someone short to accomplish. And so communicate the desire of the higher authority, that [the shortest man go first]. We may ask: has the higher authority some kind of representation or some special way of thinking about Shorty himself to infer the exportation between (19), (20) and (21)?

(19) The higher authority wants that the shortest man go first,

(20) Shorty, they (the higher authority) wants that you go first,

(21) $\exists x$ the higher authority wants that (x go first).

No, there is not. But, although there is no such kind of cognitive especial way connecting the higher authority and Shorty, Sosa claims “that suffices for exportation: it enables us to move ‘the shortest man’ outside the scope of the psychological modality, and enables us to conclude that it is true of the shortest man that the authority desires that he go first.” (890) The indefiniteness in this example consists in the fact that others singular terms may equally serve as distinguished terms. So even expressions like “the fastest man” or “the strongest man” can play a similar role⁶.

In the second example an investigator finds a footlocker with important documents inside, which strongly suggests that his owner is a spy. Thus we can attribute to the investigator the belief or, in this particular case, the knowledge that the owner of the footlocker is a spy. But in the moment when the investigator finds the footlocker he doesn’t know that he is being observed by the spy who is the owner of the footlocker and his accomplice. Seeing that scene his accomplice says: “He [the investigator] knows you are a spy now, you must scape” (891) The accomplice tells to the spy that the investigator knows that he [the owner of the footlocker] is a spy, he wants to communicate that the investigator has an important clue [the footlocker] that can lead him to discover the identity of its owner. The most important feature of this situation is the interest of the investigator on the footlocker or most properly in his owner, the owner of the footlocker.

And even if the investigator knows nothing about the spy except that he is the owner of the footlocker, according to Sosa, this is sufficient to export $\ulcorner$ the owner of the footlocker $\urcorner$ to outside from the ‘that’-clause.

(22) The investigator knows that $\ulcorner$ the owner of the footlocker is a spy $\urcorner$,

(23) He [the investigator] knows about you that $\ulcorner$ you are a spy $\urcorner$,

(24) $\exists x$ The investigator knows that (x is a spy).

⁶ I do not believe that this example is as indefinite as Sosa thinks. Because, ‘the shortest man’ is distinguish only relative to this situation, the mission which needs to be accomplished. Probably this mission requires someone whose height being relevant, and not properly his velocity [the fastest man] or his power [the strongest man]. I’m inclined to believe that, unless in this example, the important feature in this context is the mission in question and it determines which the distinguished term is.



And here what counts as a distinguished term is indefinite too, other singular terms like ‘the soldier who owns this footlocker is a spy’ or ‘the fellow who owns this footlocker is a spy’ are as appropriate as ‘the owner of the footlocker’ in that context⁷.

But sometimes what counts as a distinguished term can be pretty definite. In a very simple test applied to some children is questioned “who is the spy?”. There are four alternatives including “the tallest spy”, which is the correct answer. After the test, the tallest spy appear in the room and the psychologist remarks that most of the children marked the correct alternative, that he is the spy. Sosa remarks that is fairly clear what the distinguished term is, i.e., the tallest spy. But, in this case the distinguished term is definite, for suppose one of the children believes that the smartest spy is a spy, and further that Edgar Hoover (that counts in the list too) is the smartest spy. Even if the child to marks the correct answer, “the tallest spy”, under the guise that the smartest spy denotes the tallest spy, (for him both are the same person), the psychologist cannot say to the tallest spy that the child has seen that he is the spy on the list.

The general form of this examples is the same: someone [speaker] says to x [listener] that S [believer] believes him [x, the listener] to be F. Sosa suggests that this statements are incomplete and must be completed by the context, which it “must supply is some indication of the type of singular term (name, description, indicator) “under which” S believes x to be F.” (891) But, what exactly must be that indication? Well anything that turns the term a distinguished one: a mission in a battlefield; a footlocker; an item in a list. And that is the pragmatic character of the exportation. Maybe here it is better not to take in a contextual fashion, but to distinguish contextual from pragmatic. What is a context? And why it is so difficult treat this interests and purposes as parameters of some context?

To me it is the difficult in ordering interests and purposes, like we order worlds, times, agents, places. In a footnote Sosa wrote that “context-sensitivity of exportation is no greater than that of demonstrative reference or ambiguities of predication” (1970, p. 895, fn. 19). But there is an important difference here. It is the difference between the context-sensitivity of the demonstratives and “context sensitivity” of the exportation. For some philosophers, to be dependent on context is almost as to be the same with be relative, don’t have a rule or a calculable way to be determined. However I believe that this is wrong. A context is an ordered n-tuple including at less a speaker, a time, a place and possible world. For a demonstrative term like “I” the main parameter is the speaker, for “now” the main parameter is the time; for “here” is the place and so on. And, more important, these expressions are connected with it parameter in the context by means of the linguistic meaning⁸. But the same doesn’t happen with singular terms as names or definite descriptions (although they have a linguistic meaning), because sometimes it is a footlocker, sometimes a mission to be accomplished and other times a name on a list and so on, it can be anything. It can’t be ordered, or stablished as an n-tuple formed by a conjunct of digital impressions, DNAs, pictures of faces, roles in the community, and so on. There are a multitude of distinct elements that can be part of a

⁷ Here again, I don’t think that counts as an indefiniteness example. Since the interest is directed to the footlocker and his owner, if we don’t have any another information on that situation about what the owner of the footlocker is, a soldier or some fellow, add any complement in “... who owns this footlocker” actually don’t proves that this others singular terms are in fact relevant to suppose the indeterminacy.

⁸ That part of the cognitive value that doesn’t change from use to use.



context of exportation. So exportation is not a contextual phenomena, but it is a pragmatic one.

IV

Nevertheless, Sosa suggests that there is a simpler solution, which consists in accepting the unrestricted exportation, his account I:

- I. S believes about x that it is F (or believes x to be F) if and only if there is a singular term α such that S believes ' α is F', where α denotes x. (Sosa, 1970, p. 887)

In this case the tallest spy objection returns. How does Sosa treat this problem? His answer is claim that although it seems rhetorically misleading say that "S believes about the tallest spy that he is a spy", it is literally true. He compares this with the case where it seems wrong to say that S believes p, when S actually knows p, perhaps "saying that someone believes something is misleading when the person in question actually knows it" (Kripke, 2010 p. 337).

25) It is not appropriate or even misleading to say that S believes that p when actually S knows that p,

26) It is not appropriate or even misleading to say that S believes the tallest spy that he is a spy, when he knows that the tallest spy is a spy.

Sosa, thus, supports the unrestricted exportation thesis distinguishing literal truth from rhetorical convenience, sometimes what is literally true is not rhetorically convenient or appropriate.

Saul Kripke in his paper "Unrestricted exportation: Some morals for the Philosophy" (2011) has criticized the Sosa's pragmatic account. The Kripke's main objection is that some authors including Sosa "ignore intuitive distinctions simply by calling the "pragmatic" and giving them a Gricean explanation." (330) Although "These principles were never defended by Grice or anyone else, and in fact are devoid of plausibility." (328) Kripke develops his main objection into a way he call *wastebasket fallacy*.

About this fallacy, there are two points here. First, it seems that Kripke, although he doesn't mention it in anywhere, is trying to hold some contextual, not pragmatic, restriction on exportation, he mentions:

More important for the present case concerns why it is that writers so concerned with the hidden contextuality of a family of statements ignore *the most blatant contextual parameters*. Statements about a subject having or not having a belief (whether *de re* or *de dicto*) *plainly vary over time*⁹. All that is needed to handle Dennett's case is to suppose that Hoover did believe of his wrestling partner, *at*

⁹ My emphasis.

the time of the wrestling, that he was the murderer but has not retained the *de re* belief later. (2011, p. 339)

Kripke seems not to accept the pragmatic view in general, not only the appeal to a supposed Gricean distinction between what is literally true and what it is appropriate to say. Second, he charges the pragmatic view to be a fallacy that throws to the wind important intuitive data about *the re* beliefs.

Now, I think we cannot treat pragmatics like a wastebasket, because although it is not a semanticist's work to deal with pragmatic questions, it is work for the philosopher understand the cognitive mechanisms that enable the language's functioning and the border between semantics and pragmatics. I know that Kripke explicitly makes the same point "we should not think of pragmatics as a wastebasket" (Kripke, 2007, p. 343). However, to me he still thinks pragmatics as a wastebasket. If a certain philosopher is trying to enlighten some linguistic phenomena with Gricean maxims, it does not implies that, even if the procedure may be an overuse of the implicatures, this philosopher is throwing this phenomena in a wastebasket. Gricean maxims are not the only pragmatic way to treat nonsemantic linguistic phenomena. I believe that linguistic cognitive processes that require some ability to think about objects like persons, events, places (individuals in a metaphysical sense) and processing the information related to them belong to the pragmatic field.

Perhaps the correct question may not be what kind of concept or information we should expect our listener or believer to associate with the singular term for we export it to outside of the 'that'-clause $\ulcorner \alpha \text{ is } F \urcorner$, but instead, which cognitive operations they should perform to believe about x (under α) that it is F . That is, I don't believe that *de re* belief is reducible to some *de dicto* belief, in a sense which:

"(1) Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy, logically entails in English, and is logically entailed by, the claim that for some thoroughly conceptual or qualitative concept *such-and-such* that uniquely determines Ortcutt in an epistemologically special manner, Ralph believes that the *such-and-such* is a spy" (Salmon, 2007, p. 270)

or even:

"[I]f the question is instead whether it is in the nature of human cognition, rather than by logic, that (1) is true iff for some epistemologically special, thoroughly qualitative concept *such-and-such* of Ortcutt, Ralph believes that *such-and-such* is a spy". (p. 270-271)

The kind of cognitive ability that I propose is different from that mentioned by Salmon. Who needs to perform the cognitive process of exportation is our listener and not essentially the believer, that is, the person to whom we report the propositional attitude or simply the belief.

Thus, my concern is very modest, it is only to point for the possibility of a treatment of exportation, propositional attitudes and *de re* thoughts in terms of the ability to think about some object, something like Rocky now is prepared to win Apollo Creed. In a certain point of the history Rocky was not prepared to win Apollo, but another time he was (and he did) and what exactly enabled him defeat Creed? Develop his abilities.

In the same way, might happen that an audience does not know who which is coming to give a lecture, when actually who is coming to give that lecture is David Kaplan. But he had some problems in transit, thus someone announce to the audience

that the speaker has been delayed. So when his wife observes the time and tell to Kaplan that she is worried, Kaplan says: “don’t worry, they know I am going to be late.” I think that the most important here and in the Sosa’s examples is 1) who is the listener and 2) what the listener should to perform to understand what is mean.

So my view in this paper is something between Sosa and Kripke. I don’t agree with Sosa about the contextual appropriation of the exportation but I agree that it is a pragmatic process. And I don’t agree with Kripke that treat exportation in a pragmatic way it is thrown it to the window or thrown it in a wastebasket, but I agree that a Gricean treatment is not appropriate.

I’m trying to point that maybe, and only maybe, we can understand *de re* thoughts in terms of the ability to *manoeuvre* the items that count as “parameters” where it is required to “knowing who” someone is (a face, a name, his role in the community...) or for a term to be distinguished (a footlocker, a mission, a name on the list). So the process to manage these items for picking up the object and to understand some propositional attitude or even about what someone is thinking now is 1) pragmatic and 2) requires from us a certain ability, not concepts or representations.

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