Judicial Anarchism and Team Theory

Authors

  • Ivo Teixeira Gico Jr. UniCeuB - University Center of Brasília

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v4n2p269-294

Abstract

By interpreting legal certainty as a form of capital, the legal capital, the social consequences of the absence of coordination mechanisms between judges to create and maintain the law is analyzed, specially the resulting judicial anarchism.  A team model indicates that Brazilian judges do not have enough incentives and mechanisms to invest in legal capital and to unify legal rules.  Henceforth, legal uncertainty is expected in all areas of law, except those where there is some degree of ideological convergences between judges.

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Author Biography

Ivo Teixeira Gico Jr., UniCeuB - University Center of Brasília

Departamento de Direito

Published

2014-06-01