Public International Law as an Institutional Game

Authors

  • Alexandre Leite Santos Universidade Católica de Brasília

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v1n2p179-195

Keywords:

Capoeira, Gênero, Capoeira e Mulher

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to assess how Law and Economics can be applied to the study of Public International Law. Taking as a fact that the agents of International Law, mainly States, act pragmatically as rational entities, which maximize their own interests, it intends to show that the inexistence of a formally institutionalized system of sanctions does not make International Law ineffective, as the incentives framework of States is not limited to their supposed fear of being subjected to formal coercion.

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Published

2010-11-16