Preferências, Custos da Decisão e Normas Jurídicas no Processo Decisório das Cortes: o modelo de múltiplos comportamentos DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v2n2p264-296

Authors

  • Ricardo Ribeiro Universidade Norte do Paraná em Londrina/PR - UNOPAR

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v2n2p264-296

Abstract

This article aims to develop an alternative formal model of judicial policymaking in Supreme Courts. Differently from the mainstream approaches of Law (legal model) and Political Science (attitudinal, and strategic models), we developed the hypothesis that multiple behaviors could be observed as a function of three main explanatory variables: political preferences of judges, the limits of interpretations of rules, and decisions costs involved in the judgment of the case. As a conclusion, ten propositions about judicial policy process were developed as a way to map the determinants of a final Court decision.

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Author Biography

Ricardo Ribeiro, Universidade Norte do Paraná em Londrina/PR - UNOPAR

1) Doutor em Direito Público pela Universidade Federal de Pernambuco – UFPE, com estágio de doutoramento financiado pela CAPES no Population Research Center do Departamento de Sociologia da Universidade do Texas em Austin/EUA (Programa Vilmar Faria em Análise Quantitativa de Políticas Públicas);

2) 1 livro e 7 artigos publicados;

3) Professor titular de Direito Administrativo na Universidade Norte do Paraná em Londrina/PR.

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Published

2011-09-16

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 2 (2011): Economic Analysis of Law Review

Section

Papers

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