A (IN)EFICIÊNCIA DA PUNIÇÃO DO INSIDER TRADING À LUZ DA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO E DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS

Resumen

The article addresses the issue of insider trading in its theoretical aspects, analyzes the legislation and the jurisprudence of the Securities and Exchange Commission in light of the economic analysis of the law. The purpose is to gauge the legal framework and, by comparison, the interpretation of the administrative authority. It seeks to identify if the system adopted today in relation to the practice of the insider is effective in order to avoid criminal behavior on the part of financial market players. The use of inside information by agents who had access to them before they were made known to the general public - insider trading - has negative effects on the market and creates a situation of insecurity incompatible with the good performance of the markets. Informational asymmetry is a market failure identified by the economic analysis of the law and, although inherent in most businesses, it is a condition of anomaly when it serves as an instrument to obtain undue advantages from violators, a hypothesis recognized as opportunistic behavior. Bibliographical and data analysis is used to conclude that, despite the existence of regulations in Brazil, market agents have been eagerly promoting sophisticated methods of trading based on privileged information, with the consequence of finding efficacy failures in the market. model of repression to unwanted practice.