EMPRESA, LIVRE CONCORRÊNCIA E INCENTIVOS NO CENÁRIO DOS PLAYERS NO BRASIL PELA ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO DIREITO

Abstract

The article presents a study in the thematic scope of the company and free competition within the Brazilian Economic Constitutional Law. The research object is the contextualization of business challenges and state in the market reality in Brazil. The question remains: do the direct economic incentives of the State and some regulations of economic activities extrapolate state functions and interfere negatively in free competition? Based on elements of the Economic Analysis of Law, mainly through game theory, critical considerations were made around the theme of free competition and the relations of State intervention as a regulatory and encouraging agent. The objective of the study is to add theoretical knowledge about the contributions that the Law and Economics movement can provide to improve the analysis of legal relations and provide efficient answers to the problems inherent to the combination of Law and Economics. Bibliographic research was used with a theoretical reference, especially the Economic Analysis of Law, in deductive reasoning. In conclusion, it was evident that free competition is influenced by state incentives and regulations of economic activities, although minimal state intervention is required in some cases. Thus, it generates advantages and disadvantages for political criteria and for economic purposes that generally benefit the largest players, holders of greater political and economic power, through the practice of rent-seeking.