Balanced Coalitional Matchings
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Concorrência - associações - troca de informaçõesAbstract
In this note we define a balancedness property for a particular two sided many-to-many matching problem developed by Dimitrov and Lazarova (2008), and prove that this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of stable coalitional matchings, the solution concept proposed for this model in the latter reference. The proof is carried out by using some results from the theory of hedonic games. We also show that hedonic games defines an equivalence relation over the set of matching problems.
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