Constructing q-cyclic Games with Unique Prefixed E quilibrium
Abstract
In this work we construct a wide family of q-cyclic n-person games (Marchi and Quintas (1983)) with unique prefixed Nash equilibrium points. We extend the constructions given for bimatrix games by Marchi and Quintas (1987) and Quintas (1988 a). We prove the uniqueness of equilibrium for a wide familyof completely mixed q-cyclic game and also for a family of not completely mixed q-cyclic game, with each players having n strategies, being only m (mDownloads
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